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LIST OF PARTIES IN THE DISTRICT COURT
Chris Cannon, the Office of Congressman Chris Cannon, Chris Cannon
For Congress, Inc., Cannon Industries, Inc., The CI Group, and Cannon Engineering
Technologies, Inc. were named as defendants in Ms. Mackey's Amended Complaint.
However, only Chris Cannon, Chris Cannon for Congress, Inc. and Cannon Industries,
Inc. were served in the district court action.
After the district court dismissed Ms. Mackey's Amended Complaint in its
entirety, she filed a Motion for Entry of Final Judgment Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P.
54(b), wanting a definitive determination on whether the district court's ruling was final
with respect to only the three defendants that had been served, or whether it was final as
to all defendants named in the action. R. 521-23. The memorandum filed in conjunction
with that motion suggested that Ms. Mackey believed that "[t]echnically, [she] could still
pursue her claims against the remaining Defendants, even if that required the filing of a
new complaint." R. 526, n. 1.
Defendants objected to the motion, arguing that the court's dismissal of the
action was final as to all named defendants, whether served or not. R. 540-44. The
district court, in a minute entry dated February 9, 1999, denied Ms. Mackey's motion for
entry of a final judgment, holding that the order filed on January 11, 1999 would stand as
the final judgment in this matter. R. 566.
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated section 78-2-2(4), the Utah Supreme
Court transferred this case to the Utah Court of Appeals by order dated April 28, 1999.
R. 572. This Court therefore has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated section 78-2a-3(2)(j) and Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the district court correctly dismiss Ms. Mackey's breach of

contract claim, finding that the statements she alleged constituted breach of the
Settlement Agreement at issue, did not do so according to the terms of that Agreement?
2.

Did the district court correctly dismiss Ms. Mackey's claim for

breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, finding that the facts alleged in the
Amended Complaint failed to constitute any such breach?
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES. ORDINANCES & RULES
None.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.
the Court Below,

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition in

The background of this case is certainly its most interesting aspect. It
involves claims of "consensual contact without sex" between a married man and a coworker nineteen years his senior. It involves changes in statements by Ms. Mackey from
a claim that her involvement with this co-worker was "a little minor something with two
1

consenting adults" to claims that she had been the victim of sexual harassment, and it
involves a sexual harassment action filed against a sitting U.S. Congressman who
happened to be a member of the House Judiciary Committee that would soon decide
whether to impeach the President of the United States on charges of sexual harassment.
The case presently before the Court, however, is very limited in scope. At issue are nine
statements allegedly made by Congressman Chris Cannon to three reporters from the
Tribune newspaper on April 15, 1998.
At that time, Cannon truthfully stated that neither he, nor any entities with
which he was associated paid any money to settle sexual harassment charges levied by
Ms. Mackey. Cannon also allegedly made eight additional comments, five of which
appeared in the Tribune. R. 293 (Appellant's Addendum B at \ 14); R. 357-58
(Appellant's Addendum A); T. 113:6-13 (A complete copy of the transcript of the
hearings held in this matter is attached as Addendum 1). Ms. Mackey claims that these
comments constituted a material and flagrant breach of the confidentiality clause
contained in a Settlement Agreement signed February 9, 1998. R. 376.
Ms. Mackey, formerly a field worker for Congressman Cannon, brought
charges of sexual harassment against Cannon and various entities with which he was
associated. The parties settled those harassment charges on April 9, 1998. R. 375 at % 9.
As part of that settlement, the parties entered a Settlement Agreement, which included a
confidentiality clause. That confidentiality clause prohibited the parties from disclosing
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"confidential information," which was defined by the Settlement Agreement as being
"the factual and legal allegations relating to their claims and disputes arising prior
to the date of this Settlement Agreement." R. 375 at Tf 10 (emphasis added). The
Settlement Agreement further set out a series of steps that prescribed what could be said
with respect to payment of any settlement, and in particular payment by Chris Cannon
and his associated entities. As detailed below, Mr. Cannon's right to state to the press
that he had not paid anything to settle Ms. Mackey's claims was dependent upon specific
media pressure regarding that topic. Id.
It is undisputed that neither Mr. Cannon nor any of his entities paid any
amount to settle Ms. Mackey's claims. Mr. Cannon maintains that he was under
precisely the type of media pressure outlined in the Settlement Agreement as allowing
him to disclose specifically that neither he nor any of his associated entities paid Ms.
Mackey anything in settlement of her claims. R. 337,410-11, T. 41:12 - 42:12. Through
his chief of staff, he had previously made those statements to the press, and an article
reflecting those facts was published in the Deseret News. R. 363. As the impending
impeachment of the President drew near, however, interest in Cannon's involvement in
sexual harassment claims arose among "the national press," as a "Democratic operative"
from California was alleged to have been attempting to dig up dirt on Judiciary
Committee members. Cannon's office was contacted by The Hill newspaper, among
others. R. 337,410-11, T. 41:15-21; R. 205-206 (Transcript 4:4 - 5:2) (Appellant's
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Addendum D). Mr. Hoole admits that he too had been contacted by The Hill, but he
declined to return their call. R. 206 (Transcript 5:3-4).
In any event, in response to this media pressure, Mr. Cannon met with
reporters from The Salt Lake Tribune, and informed them, consistent with the statements
that had already been printed in the Deseret News, that neither he nor any of his
associated entities paid any monies to settle Mackey's sexual harassment case. See
generally, Appellant's Addendum D, R. 202-218. A Tribune reporter, Dan Harrie,
immediately phoned Mackey's counsel, Roger Hoole, and told Hoole that Cannon had
made the foregoing statements. Hoole recorded his conversation with Mr. Harrie, and
based on the content of that conversation, filed the present suit the following day,
April 16, 1998. Id.,R. 310 at ^ 5.
The original complaint in this matter contained five causes of action:
1) interference with contract, 2) invasion of privacy (by means of intrusion upon
seclusion, public disclosure of private facts, and placing the Plaintiff in a false light),
3) defamation, 4) infliction of emotional distress, and 5) breach of contract. The
complaint also alleged a right to recover punitive damages. R. 3-6.
As noted above, the defendants that had been served in the case1 responded
with a motion to dismiss, filed May 7, 1998. R. 136-53. Mackey did not respond to the

1

For ease of reference the Cannon defendants will be referred to herein simply as
"Cannon."
4

motion to dismiss, but rather, on or about May 22, 1998, she filed a motion to enlarge
time in which she would be required to respond to the motion to dismiss. R. 173-79. On
June 1, 1998, Cannon opposed that request, asserting that Mackey did not need more
time to determine whether her complaint did or did not state a claim. R. 229-32. Mackey
then filed a Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint, on July 6, 1998.
R. 288-99.
On July 10, 1998, Cannon responded that Mackey did not need leave to file
an amended complaint, since no answer had been filed in the matter, and that
nevertheless, the proposed amended complaint still failed to state any claim upon which
relief could be granted. R. 334-42. Cannon therefore requested that the court consider
his response as a motion to dismiss both the original and amended complaint. R. 335.2
Ms. Mackey also filed numerous discovery motions during this period of
time seeking, among other things, to take Mr. Cannon's deposition, to take the
depositions of various Tribune reporters, and to obtain a copy of the tape of Cannon's
interview with the Tribune reporters. See generally, R. 10-69; 168-228; 302-07.
Various memoranda were filed by Cannon and the Tribune opposing these motions,
arguing that until the district court ruled on the motion to dismiss, and thus the adequacy

2

The amended complaint dropped the claim for interference with a contract, and
added the claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
R. 295.
5

of the complaint in stating a claim, discovery would be inappropriate. R. 70-135;
154-59; 233-85; 343-45.
The district court held a hearing on Cannon's motion to dismiss, Mackey's
motion to amend, and the various discovery motions on July 28, 1998. R. 575; T. 2-69.
First, based on Cannon's lack of objection to the motion to amend, the district court
granted the motion. R. 575; T. 4:16-17. Cannon then argued that the motion to dismiss
should be granted by default because Ms. Mackey failed to respond to it. T. 5:7 - 6:11.
Cannon also argued the merits of the motion to dismiss on all causes of action. T. 6:12 19:7. Ms. Mackey's counsel argued against the motion to dismiss, and further requested
additional time to brief her claims of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing. T. 44:16-18.
Because the district court had accepted Ms. Mackey's amended complaint,
it treated the motion to dismiss as going to the amended complaint. T. 66:21 - 67:2.
Moreover, the court considered extrinsic evidence submitted by the parties, including the
transcript of Mr. Hoole's conversation with Mr. Harrie. As such, the motion to dismiss
was effectively converted to a motion for summary judgment. See Lind v. Lynch, 665
P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1983), and Thayne v. Beneficial Utah, Inc., 874 P.2d 120, 124
(Utah 1994). The court granted Cannon's motion with respect to the claims of
defamation and invasion of privacy, infliction of emotional distress and the claim for
punitive damages. T. 67:8-13. The court, at that time, denied the motion on the breach
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of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims, and allowed
Ms. Mackey additional time to brief those issues. Id. at 67:13-19. Finally, the court
withheld ruling on the discovery motions until the briefing on the motion to dismiss was
completed. Id. at 67:19 - 68:17.
On August 26, 1998, Ms. Mackey filed her Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss her two remaining claims: breach of contract and breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. R. 384-398. Mackey argued an
extremely broad interpretation of the confidentiality clause contained in the Settlement
Agreement. Specifically, she argued that the Settlement Agreement precluded Cannon
from expressing his "personal views, opinions or conclusions about the factual and
legal allegations relating to the claims and disputes which existed between [the parties]
before the Settlement Agreement was signed." R. 389 (emphasis added). She further
claimed that "[t]he requirement that the Parties maintain in strict confidence all of their
personal views, opinions or conclusions about the factual and legal allegations relating
to their claims and disputes [was] absolute." Id. (emphasis added). Finally, she claimed
that "[b]y expressing his personal views, opinions or conclusions about information
made confidential by the Settlement Agreement,... Mr. Cannon committed a flagrant
and material breach of the Settlement Agreement." Id. (emphasis added).
With respect to breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, Mackey argued that Cannon believed "he is free to say virtually anything he
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feels is appropriate about the factual and legal allegations relating to the settled claims
and disputes." R. 394. She then stated "Mr. Cannon therefore claims that he has
retained discretion to comment as he chooses on the Settlement Agreement and the
underlying factual and legal disputes." Id. This, according to Mackey, implicates the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, because "discretionary power cannot be
exercised arbitrarily, unreasonably, unfairly or in bad faith." R. 395 (citation omitted).
Cannon responded to that memorandum on October 8, 1998, arguing that
the plain language of the Settlement Agreement defined "confidential information" to
include only "the factual and legal allegations relating to [the Parties'] claims and
disputes arising prior to the date of this Settlement Agreement," and claiming that none
of the statements attributed to Cannon fit that definition. R. 402-436. Rather, the
statements that Mackey apparently found so offensive constituted either Cannon's
personal opinions of matters arising after the Settlement Agreement was signed, or were
reiterations of statements that had previously been printed in the press, and thus, could
not, by definition, be deemed confidential. R. 405-07.
In other words, Cannon argued that the plain language of the
confidentiality agreement provided a more narrow definition of what the parties were
prohibited from talking about. Defense counsel later argued that this was completely
consistent with the requirement that confidentiality clauses must be strictly construed
because they constitute restraints on speech, and that this was particularly true in the case
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of a sitting U.S. Congressman who is covered by the speech and debate clause of the
U.S. Constitution. T. 92:12-17. She further argued that it was clear the Settlement
Agreement had not been breached, because the district court sat "in complete ignorance
of what the factual and legal allegations were that gave rise to this settlement agreement."
Nobody had a clue what the legal theories or facts were. T. 91:15-25.
With respect to Mackey's claim of breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, Cannon argued that Mackey was attempting to create a new cause
of action, which is strictly forbidden under Utah law governing breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, and that she was attempting to bolster this argument by
attributing arguments and beliefs to Cannon which he had never made and did not hold —
in particular the statement she made in her brief that Cannon believed he was free to say
anything he wanted about the Settlement Agreement. R. 409-11. Cannon argued that
there had been no breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Id.
The district court held a hearing on these two remaining causes of action on
December 10, 1998. T. 70. Again, the court considered extrinsic evidence in ruling on
the motion, thereby effectively transforming the motion to one for summary judgment
under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Lindv. Lynch, 665 P.2d 1276, 1278
(Utah 1983), and Thayne v. Beneficial Utah, Inc., 874 P.2d 120, 124 (Utah 1994). Five
days later, on December 15, 1998, the district court issued its ruling in a recorded
telephone conference in chambers. T. 112:1-3. The court first denied a request Ms.
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Mackey had filed to open the record to submit the entire Settlement Agreement. T.
112:23 - 113:5. The court then went through the eight statements Ms. Mackey claims
constituted breach of the Settlement Agreement in some detail, and held that none of the
statements constituted breach of the Settlement Agreement as a matter of law. T. 113:6 115:20. The court further found that Mr. Cannon's failure to contact Mr. Hoole prior to
meeting with the Tribune was not a breach of the Settlement Agreement, because Hoole
had been contacted on this subject previously, and that contact was sufficient. Finally,
the court found that there had been no breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. Id.
Those findings were finalized in an order dated January 11, 1999. R. 510.3
The order stated:
Paragraph 14 of Plaintiff s Amended Complaint includes
Plaintiffs allegations of the statements by Mr. Cannon that
Plaintiff claims constituted breaches of the settlement
agreement. The Court, having considered each allegation, A
through H, in turn and having compared these allegations to
the language of the settlement agreement as set forth in
Paragraph 10 of the Amended Complaint, finds that none of
the alleged statements constitute a breach of the settlement
agreement.
The Court further found that Mr. Cannon did not
breach the settlement agreement by failing to notify Roger
Hoole prior to speaking to the Salt Lake Tribune since he had
previously notified Mr. Hoole prior to speaking with the

3

The order was delayed because Ms. Mackey objected to the form of the order,
and all parties filed responses to that objection. R. 462-508.
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Deseret News. This fact was undisputed by Mr. Hoole in the
hearing.
It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed that the
above referenced matter is dismissed with prejudice.
R. 510. A copy of the court's order is attached as Addendum 2.
B.

Statement of Facts.
Initial Press Coverage of the Relationship
Between Crelley Mackey and Chuck Warren

On June 29, 1997, the Salt Lake Tribune published a story, written by Dan
Harrie and Laurie Sullivan Maddox, headlined "Can Cannon Cash Fix Staff Problem?"
R. 348-50. Again, copies of all of the newspaper articles are included in Appellant's
Addendum A. The article began: "Utah Rep. Chris Cannon is offering to pay $5,000 to
cover the 'expenses and problems' of a female staffer who had an intimate relationship
with the congressman's top aide but made no formal claim of sexual harassment."
R. 348. The article went on to state that Mr. Cannon had "enlisted a former FBI agent to
investigate the relationship between chief of staff Charles R. Warren and Salt Lake
County field coordinator Crelley Mackey

" Id.

The article vaguely described the alleged relationship between Mackey and
Warren. It stated in one place that both Mackey and Warren described their relationship
as "consensual contact without sex." The article indicated that the relationship had been
going on for about a year, beginning at Cannon Industries, where Warren and Mackey
both worked, and continuing through Cannon's congressional campaign and into the
11

period after Cannon was sworn into office. Id. Warren was quoted as having stated that
"he and Mackey did not sleep together and none of their activity occurred on
congressional time or at federal expense." He noted that the relationship ended abruptly,
and is quoted as having said "We both knew it was something wrong. It just stopped.
We're sick about this." Id.
In the article, Mackey is noted to be unmarried and 19 years older than
Warren, and is quoted as having called the relationship "a little minor something with
two consenting adults." Id. She is further noted to have said that "[t]here was some
contact,... but she insists she never felt harassed, threatened in her job or victimized."
Mackey's then attorney, Susan McDonald, is quoted as saying "There definitely was
sexual harassment." Id.
This article repeatedly referred to Cannon's offer to "broker a settlement,"
and stated that it was unclear whether any payment would comefromCannon personally,
from his company, Cannon Industries, orfromthe U.S. government. R. 348-50. Later
the article noted that Cannon denied that sexual harassment would be tolerated in his
workplace, and said that his offer of $5,000 to Mackey was what she asked for to cover
counseling bills. R. 349. Cannon further indicated in the article that if it was allowed by
the rules governing the House of Representatives, he would be willing to personally pay
the $5,000. Cannon denied the payment was hush money. The article concluded by
stating "[t]his isn't the first time [Cannon] has moved to fix a problem with money." Id.
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The article went on to describe Warren as very driven and at times hard to
get along with. However, it quoted Mackey as having stated that "Warren could be a
jerk, but he also could be sweet. She called him 'a decent guy. He's got a real attitude.
He's adorable and talented. Mackey said the two were good friends - 'extremely close.'"
R. 350.
This article began a series of articles that would be printed in both of
Utah's daily newspapers about Mackey, Warren and Cannon. The next article, headlined
"2 Aides Take Time Off While Cannon Reviews 'Improper' Relationship," was
published in the Deseret News on July 2, 1997. R. 368-69. This article again described
Mackey and Warren's relationship as "consensual contact without sex," this time as
described by Cannon's then press secretary, Peter Valcarce. Id. The article reiterated
that Cannon had hired a former FBI investigator to look into the relationship, and that it
was undecided whether "that probe will be paid by congressional or other funds." Id.
The article again stated that Cannon had offered to pay Mackey $5,000, which he did
"not view either as hush money or a settlement for any potential sexual harassment
claim." Id.
Both the Tribune and Deseret News ran articles the next day, July 3, 1997,
reporting that "Chris Cannon's chief of staff, Charles Warren, resigned Thursday amid
allegations that he sexually harassed another staffer." R. 351-52; 366. The Deseret
News article again referred to the relationship as "consensual contact without sex." The
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article also reported that Mackey's attorney planned to file sexual harassment charges,
and that Cannon would be named in the complaint "because of his duty to oversee his
office and employees." R. 366. The article again quoted Cannon's staff as indicating
that "it is undecided whether congressional funds will help pay for [the FBI] probe," and
stressing that "no payments have been made and that Cannon [was] working with House
ethics lawyers to ensure any payments made comply with the law." And, again, Cannon
is noted to have said that "he felt that an improper but consensual relationship had
occurred - not sexual harassment - but he tried to broker a deal that included an offer to
pay $5,000 to Mackey for counseling and other expenses." Id.
The Tribune article that day, again written by Dan Harrie and Laurie
Sullivan-Maddox, ran similar material. R. 351-52. The article began "Utah Rep. Chris
Cannon's chief of staff, Charles R. Warren, resigned Wednesday after acknowledging he
had an improper sexual relationship with a Cannon staffer who now claims he sexually
harassed her." R. 351. The article, like the one that ran in the Deseret News, said that
sexual harassment claims would be filed, and that "Cannon [would] be named because of
his responsibility to oversee the office

" The article further explicitly stated "there

are no allegations that the congressman personally harassed Mackey." Id. The article
mentioned again that Cannon had initially offered $5,000 to Ms. Mackey.
It further stated, "Warren has denied ever harassing Mackey, and Mackey
previously told the Tribune she was not harassed." Id. It continued, "Both aides
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characterized their relationship as consensual contact without sex. Warren said it was
mainly necking, while Mackey alternately described it as hugs, a kiss in an elevator, close
friendship and a few 'pats on the head.'" Id.
The article further stated that "Cannon stands by his statements last week
that he believed the relationship between staffers was 'inappropriate' but
consensual...." R. 351-52. And, once again, the article stated that Cannon, Cannon
Industries or the government might be involved in paying for the FBI probe that initiated
this matter. R. 352. An unidentified lawyer was quoted as having suggested that any
payments would most likely come from Cannon himself. Id.
The next series of articles ran when Ms. Mackey filed her sexual
harassment claims. On July 30, 1997, the Tribune noted that Ms. Mackey's present
counsel, Roger Hoole, had filed sexual harassment complaints against Cannon's
"congressional office, his venture-capital firm and his 1996 political campaign."
R. 353-54. The article again specifically stated that "Cannon [was] not personally
accused of inappropriate behavior. 'But under the law, the responsibility is at the feet of
the employer because the employer is supposed to take steps to see that this kind of
conduct does not occur,' Hoole said." Id. Hoole, in this article, is also noted to have
"stressed that the relationship never was consensual." He described Mackey's then
employment with the congressman's office as "a roller-coaster ride through hell

" Id.

"She's either the greatest thing since buttered bread or nobody wants to have anything to
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do with her,' [Hoole] said, referring to office tensions since Mackey's allegations
publicly surfaced a month ago." Id. The article again referred to Cannon's previous
offer to pay Mackey $5,000. "As for the $5,000 settlement offer, Hoole said 'that's long
rejected."
Cannon's then chief of staff, Steve Taggart, is reported to have said that
"Hoole 'threw out some numbers' for a financial settlement. 'Frankly, we didn't take
them too seriously'."
The next day, July 31, 1997, the Deseret News reported on the sexual
harassment suit. Like the Tribune article, the Deseret News stated
Although Hoole would not discuss specifics of the case, he
said the sexual harassment involves Cannon's former chief of
staff, Charles R. Warren, who resigned from his post after the
allegations surfaced in late June.
The complaints allege Mackey was pressured into a nonconsensual physical relationship and seeks unspecified
compensation and the assurance that she will not be retaliated
against at work for filing the complaint, Hoole said. Neither
Cannon nor Warren are personally named in the
complaints, Hoole said.
R. 365 (emphasis added). The report again stated Cannon's belief that "he felt that an
improper but consensual relationship had occurred - not sexual harassment - but he tried
to broker a deal that included an offer to pay $5,000 to Mackey for counseling and other
expenses." Id.
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The next articles ran, one in each paper, on January 20, 1998, when Ms.
Mackey was placed on administrative leave. R. 355, 364. The Deseret News article
again noted that Cannon was only named in his capacity as employer. R. 364. The
Tribune article similarly addressed that issue again, stating "The complaints filed on
behalf of Mackey name Cannon because of his responsibility to oversee his employees,
and not because of any claims of inappropriate sexual behavior on his part." R. 355.
The Terms of the Settlement Agreement
The foregoing newspaper accounts leave a plethora of unanswered
questions. The nature of the "physical non-sexual" contact is unknown. The behavior
Ms. Mackey now claims constituted sexual harassment is unknown. Mackey's reasons
for stating that there was no sexual harassment, and then changing that statement are
unknown. What happened between Mackey and Warren is unknown. While the length
of the relationship is stated to have been over a year, the frequency of the alleged contact
is unknown. The reasons Mackey followed Warren to work for Cannon in three different
jobs, during which time Mackey now claims she was being sexually harassed by Warren,
is unknown. Whether there was any evidence supporting Mackey's claims is unknown.
Whether there was any evidence contradicting Mackey's claims is unknown. The
reasons for Mr. Cannon's repeated statements to the press that he believed the
relationship was consensual are unknown. How Cannon became aware of the
relationship in the first place is unknown. The reasons Cannon hired a former FBI agent
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to investigate the relationship is unknown. The investigator's findings are unknown.
Mackey's legal theories are unknown. Cannon's legal theories are unknown. The
amounts (if any), paid Mackey in settlement of her claims is unknown. All that is known
is information that was set out by the press as outlined above.
The reason the press does not know more about this relationship is that on
February 9, 1998, the parties to this action entered an agreement titled "MUTUAL
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND FULL RELEASE." R. 140. That agreement
identified the parties to it as follows:
This Settlement Agreement is made by and between Crelley
Mackey ("Ms. Mackey"), and the Office of Congressman
Chris Cannon ("Employing Office"), Cannon Industries,
Chris Cannon, The CI Group, Cannon Industries, Inc.,
Cannon Engineering Technologies, Inc., and any and all
other affiliated Cannon Entities (collectively the "Cannon
Entities"), Chris Cannon for Congress, Inc. (the "Campaign")
and Charles R. Warren ("Mr. Warren").
Id. The controlling language of the Settlement Agreement reads as follows:
The Parties agree that the factual and legal allegations
relating to their claims and disputes arising prior to the
date of this Settlement Agreement shall be confidential
and that they shall not disclose to any third party that
confidential information, the terms of the settlement or
the amount of the payments made under the Settlement
Agreement, except (a) to their attorneys, therapists, tax
advisors or their ecclesiastical leaders, or as required by
l a w ; . . . (c) to disclose on Monday, February 9, 1998 that
"Ms. Mackey's claims against the Employing Office, the
Cannon Entities, the Campaign and Mr. Warren have been
resolved to the Parties' satisfaction; (d) thereafter, if
pressured by the media, to disclose (after first having spoken
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with Roger H. Hoole), that "Ms. Mackey's claims against the
Employing Office, the Cannon Entities, the Campaign and
Mr. Warren have been resolved to the Parties satisfaction by
settlement without any admission of liability, or payment of
monies from Chris Cannon or the use of tax dollars, and that
Ms. Mackey has voluntarily resigned her position as Field
Coordinator in the Provo Office of Chris Cannon in order to
accept employment with the Utah Legislature effective
February 1, 1998"; and (e) thereafter, if further pressured by
the media and asked specifically whether Cannon entities or
individuals contributed money to the settlement, Mr. Cannon
or his representative may respond (after first having spoken
with Roger H. Hoole) that "no Cannon entities or campaign
contributed to any settlement." Other than as specifically
allowed herein, the Parties and their attorneys shall not
volunteer any confidential information, and in response to
any request for information by any person or entity shall say
only "no comment."
R. 146-47; 375 at ^ 10 (Settlement Agreement at ^ 6)(emphasis added).
Subsequent Press Releases and Articles
Settlement of Mackey's sexual harassment charges led to additional media
attention, and resulted in more news articles. The Tribune ran an article on
February 10, 1998, noting that Mackey's claims had been settled, "with the undisclosed
settlement averting a threatened lawsuit." R. 356 (See Appellant's Addendum A). The
article reiterated that "Mackey filed sexual harassment claims in July, alleging she was
pressured into an unwanted physical relationship with former Cannon staff chief Charles
R. Warren." It continued, "Warren resigned July 2, shortly after published reports about
his relationship with Mackey. Cannon had arranged the hiring of a retired FBI agent to
conduct a private investigation and subsequently offered to pay Mackey $5,000 — an
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offer she refused." Id. And, once again, the article stated that "Cannon was not
personally accused of any improper behavior. However, Mackey's attorney, Roger
Hoole, had claimed that as the employer Cannon had responsibility for the actions of his
managers." Id.
The article further stated again that Mackey and Warren had worked for
Cannon in three separate capacities - "at his Salt Lake City-based investment firm, his
successful campaign and in the congressional office." Finally, the article stated that
"[t]he settlement included confidentiality terms[,]" and that Cannon's office and Mr.
Hoole "confined their comments to a single agreed-to written sentence: 'Ms. Mackey's
claims against the employing [congressional] office, the Cannon entities [Cannon's
venture-capital firm, Cannon Industries], the campaign and Mr. Warren have been
resolved to the parties' satisfaction.'" Id.
The next day, February 11, 1998, the Deseret News ran a more detailed
article. The article repeated that Warren had described his relationship with Mackey as
"'consensual physical contact without sex,' but which Mackey said in claims was
unwanted sexual harassment." R. 363. It further reiterated the fact that "[t]he
relationship [between Mackey and Warren] began when both worked for Cannon's
venture capital firm, Cannon Industries, and continued as they worked on Cannon's 1996
campaign and later in his congressional office." Id. This article again mentioned that
Cannon "had hired a former FBI agent to investigate the[] relationship," and that Cannon
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had initially been willing "to pay $5,000 to Mackey for counseling and other expenses."
The article further noted that Cannon's then chief of staff, Steve Taggart, "said Cannon
did not pay any money personally to Mackey as part of the final settlement." Id.
"He said the settlement was reached 'without any admission of liability or
payment of monies from Chris Cannon or the use of tax dollars.'" Id. He further said
"terms of the settlement did not allow him to offer any further details, and other
comments were limited to one sentence released jointly by Cannon and Mackey's
attorney." Id. Mr. Hoole acknowledged that Taggart contacted him before making this
comment to the Deseret News. T. 29:10 - 30:1.
Ms. Mackey's brief states that "[t]here is no evidence in the Record that
Mr. Cannon felt compelled to release, or did in fact release, a further statement to the
press in conformity with exception (e) [of the Settlement Agreement]. Brief of Appellant
at p. 7, Tf 10. The Court will recall that this is the exception that allows Cannon to state,
"if further pressured by the media and asked specifically whether the Cannon Entities or
individuals contributed money to the settlement, Mr. Cannon . . . may respond (after
having spoken with Roger H. Hoole) that 'no Cannon entities or campaign contributed to
any settlement.'" R. 146-47; 375 at^j 10.

21

The Phone Conversation Between Roger Hoole and Dan Harrie
At paragraph 22 of Mackey's brief, she quotes, quite selectively,fromthe
phone conversation Mr. Hoole had with reporter Dan Harrie "on April 15th, at 2:19 p.m."
Brief of Appellant at pp. 10-12. These selective quotations could suggest, as Mackey's
brief states, that Mr. Cannon just walked into the Tribune office willy-nilly to disclose
intimate details of the Mackey/Warren relationship. Examination of the portions of the
transcript Ms. Mackey failed to provide the Court, however, demonstrates that Cannon
was under precisely the type of media pressure that brought exception (e) of the
Settlement Agreement into play, and that any comments he made were either expressly
authorized under exception (e) or were not disclosures of "confidential information."
The transcript states as follows:
MR. HOOLE:

Chris Cannon was in your office today?

MR. HARRIE:

He was in our office. So as I said, he's back in the
district. They're on recess. And so I joined them for,
you know, just a conversation. And immediately Chris
wanted to start talking about the Crelley case.

MR. HOOLE:

Really?

MR. HARRIE:

I swear to you, I didn't bring it up.

MR. HOOLE:

Really?

MR. HARRIE:

And what he wanted to get out there is the fact that he,
through the Congressional office, through the
campaign, Cannon Industries, has paid no money at all
in terms of a settlement.
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MR. HOOLE:

And he just volunteered that?

MR. HARRIE:

Oh, absolutely.**4

MR. HOOLE:

You didn't ask him -

MR. HARRIE:

I didn't really.

MR. HOOLE:

What was the topic that he was talking about? I mean,
is that why he came to the Tribune?

MR. HARRIE:

Oh, no. He came to talk with John Helnsen [sic] who
took over Lori's [sic] beat and has interviewed Chris
over the phone and dealt with his staff, but he's never
met him in person.
So basically to meet, conversation with John and I
joined them and Judy Fahyse joined the, and honestly,
I mean, I was in there for a minute and I said hello,
basically, and introduced myself to one of his aides,
and he started talking about it and said that, you know,
that when I had written my last story - and Fm talking
about the settlement - that it was only part of the story.
The rest of the story was that no money had
changed or had gone from Chris in any form or
fashion, or any of the entities with which he was
associated, to Crelley; that no benefits had been
conveyed from Chris or any of his entities to
Crelley. And, as it turns out, I think that what is
happening is, and I'm just looking for the story
myself on the wire, but apparently there's a story
on the wire from over the weekend about a
California Democratic party operative who is
basically trying to dig up dirt on members of the
judiciary committee.

4

Ms. Mackey's recitation of this conversation omits everything between the "**"
symbols.
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MR. HOOLE:

And Chris Cannon serves on that committee.

MR.HARRIE:

And Chris Cannon serves on that committee. And
this subject of the Crelley case has come up. And I
guess they've had some calls in recent days about
that. As it turns out, I guess the Deseret News had
a story about the settlement as well. And I didn't
see it at the time. I was covering the legislature -

MR. HOOLE:

Yeah, I don't even remember it.

MR.HARRIE:

I don't either. But apparently it said that no
money was paid out as part of the settlement. But
Deseret News is not on Lexis/Nexis, which is what a
lot of the reporters and others use to get
information. Apparently there's been something in
the last few days on The Hill, which is a newspaper
that covers Capital Hill and -

MR. HOOLE:

Yeah.

MR.HARRIE:

And they're getting calls from other reporters too
in regards to the -

MR. HOOLE:

I did get a call from one of the reporters from The
Hill and I didn't return his call.

MR.HARRIE:

So I think what is happening is a little inoculation
here.** I mean, basically he's telling me this stuff
and, you know, and went into some detail. And
basically said, now, I'm not saying that you need to
run a story on this, in fact, you know, I'd just as soon
you didn't. But, I mean, obviously he's not telling me
this stuff on the record so that I don't write his story.

MR. HOOLE:

So now, were you on the record or off the record?

MR.HARRIE:

No. This was all on the record.

MR. HOOLE:

This is no confidential source, nothing like that?
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MR. HARRIE:

Absolutely not. This is from Chris Cannon.

MR. HOOLE:

Yeah.

MR. HARRIE:

And two other reporters were in there and heard it.
You know, there's just no question about that.

MR. HOOLE:

Well-

MR. HARRIE:

**Let me go on here a little bit. Basically the idea, I
guess, is that the fellow, this Democratic operative,
that is looking up the background of some of the
members of the judiciary, and this issue with
Crelley and sexual harassment, you know, could
prove to be somewhat embarrassing because of the
nature of some of the allegations against the
President, so, you know, I mean, we talked about it
for a little, once he started talking about it, of
course, then I started to ask questions.
And we came back to it a couple of times. And, you
know, I asked him some questions - and I'm just
looking over my notes here - and he said, oh, well, I
said, you know, in the context of this - okay,
"You're saying Congressman, that no money was
transferred?" And I said, "Well, obviously, you
know, part of the agreement was that Crelley
would not pursue the complaints against you and
that she was leaving the office. And that was
actions on her part that were part of the
agreement." And I said, "Well, what was it on
your part?"

MR. HOOLE:

So you just assumed that and stated that to him?

MR. HARRIE:

I said that.

MR. HOOLE:

Okay.
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MR. HARRIE:

And he basically, well, not anything really, that
there were no payments, no money, no benefits
conveyed. And I said, "Well, and then there was an
implication that maybe something was paid in
settlement by Chuck Warren."

MR. HOOLE:

Who made that implication? I mean did somebody
infer that or -

MR. HARRIE:

Well, I think it was a little of both. You know, we
talked, he said something to the effect that I'm talking
about entities that I'm associated with, not any other
entities. And so and I said something to the effect, I
asked the question, "Well, so there's no string back
to you or any of the entities to which you're
associated that deal with this case? That there was
a payment in settlement?" And he said,
"Absolutely not."
And so John, I think it was John Halpreck [sic] asked
a question, "Well, are you talking about other entities?
What are you talking about?" And he said, "Well, of
course the other entity in this case was Chuck
Warren." And then I asked him about Chuck and they,
basically Cannon said, "I haven't seen him but once.
He resigned and he has an entirely separate attorney.
We have nothing to do with that." There's no, there's
basically no involvement of the Congressman or his
entities as in regards to Chuck Warren.
Now as the conversation continued then, you know, as
I said, came back to it a couple of times, the
conversation was rather broad-ranging, but when I
came back to it, I said, "Well, so now national press
are looking into this as a result of this fellow in
California." And I said "Isn't it going to prove
somewhat, isn't it going to prove somewhat
embarrassing to you that there is this
confidentiality agreement? You're saying that you
had no, that there was no wrongdoing on your
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part, Congressman, that you weren't involved in
this? Well, we've never said that you were being
personally accused of anything but there was a
claim of hostile environment."**
R. 203-209 (Transcript pages 2:18 - 8:7)(emphasis added).
As noted in the transcript Mr. Hoole recorded, Mr. Cannon, a member of
the House Judiciary Committee, then posed to impeach President Clinton in part on
charges of sexual harassment, was receiving national media pressure regarding any
payments he may have made in a sexual harassment claim in which he was a named
defendant. In response, he truthfully informed the local newspaper, whose stories are
carried on-line, and are thus available to the national press, that neither he nor any of the
entities with which he is associated paid any money in settlement to Ms. Mackey. Id.
Those statements were repeated in the article run by the Tribune on April 16, 1998.
R. 200-01 (Appellant's Addendum C).
Ms. Mackey claims that those statements constitute breach of the
Settlement Agreement. She further claims that the following eight statements, allegedly
made by Mr. Cannon to the Tribune reporters on April 15, 1998, constitute breach of the
Settlement Agreement:
a.

That no hostile environment existed in Mr. Cannon's office;

b.

That there was nothing to Ms. Mackey's allegations;

c.

That Ms. Mackey's allegations had no merit;

d.

That her allegations wouldn't have held up;
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e.

That there was no impropriety on Mr. Cannon's part;

f.

That Crelley Mackey has the ability to waive confidentiality;

g.

That they are not holding her to confidentiality; and

h.

That although she is free to discuss it, there would be no benefit for

her to talk about it publicly.
R. 376; Brief of Appellant at pp. 8-9. These are all of the allegations upon which Ms.
Mackey bases her claims for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, and these are the allegations the district court found did not constitute a
breach of the Settlement Agreement.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Ms. Mackey is angry because Congressman Cannon truthfully informed the
Tribune that neither he nor any of his associated entities paid her a nickel to settle her
sexual harassment claims. It has never been clear why Mackey finds this statement so
upsetting. Nevertheless, her claim that this disclosure violated the terms of the
Settlement Agreement prevails only if the Court accepts an unreasonably narrow view of
the plain language of the Settlement Agreement and simultaneously ignores (as Ms.
Mackey did in her brief) the media pressure that Mr. Cannon faced at the time he made
the disclosure.
Ms. Mackey then claims that at the time Cannon met with reporters from
the Tribune, he made eight additional statements that constituted breach of the Settlement
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Agreement. In order to constitute such a breach, however, the district court had to find
that Cannon "disclose[d] to a[] third party . . . confidential information, the terms of the
settlement or the amount of the payments made under the Settlement Agreement... ."
R. 146-47; 375 at ^f 10. "Confidential information," is specifically defined by the
Settlement Agreement as "the factual and legal allegations relating to [the Parties']
claims and disputes arising prior to the date of this Settlement Agreement." Reading the
foregoing plain language of the Settlement Agreement, the district court correctly
concluded that Cannon did not disclose to any third party any of the items prohibited by
the Settlement Agreement. The facts mandate the same result in this Court.
Mackey's claim that Cannon breached the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing by vitiating "the agreed-upon common purpose of the confidentiality
clause and Ms. Mackey's justified expectations" is unfair, because this Court, like the
district court, sits in complete ignorance of what the "factual and legal allegations
relating to [the Parties'] claims and disputes arising prior to the date of this Settlement
Agreement" were. If those facts were before the Court, it would be obvious that "the
agreed-upon common purpose of the confidentiality clause" had absolutely nothing to do
with "revelations" of the types of statements Mackey now claims were so damaging to
her.
In any event, it is plain under Utah law that the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing cannot be employed to establish new, independent contractual
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rights or duties. Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 840 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Though Ms. Mackey vehemently denies that this is what she is attempting to do, it is, in
fact, precisely what she is attempting to do. She has no contractual right to recovery
under the Settlement Agreement, and thus, she is trying to establish that right under the
implied covenant. The law does not allow her to do so, and the facts of this case do not
allow her to do so. The district court's decision on this claim should be upheld.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED MACKEY'S
BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM BECAUSE, AS A MATTER OF
LAW, NONE OF THE STATEMENTS SHE CLAIMED
CONSTITUTED BREACH OF THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
IN FACT DID SO.
As noted above, the plain terms of the Settlement Agreement prohibit the

disclosure "to any third party" of three very explicit things: 1) "confidential information,"
which is defined in the Settlement Agreement as "the factual and legal allegations
relating to [the Parties'] claims and disputes arising prior to the date of th[e]
Settlement Agreement[;]" 2) "the terms of the settlement^]" and 3) "the amount of the
payments made under the Settlement Agreement... ." R. 146-47; 375 at ^ 10 (emphasis
added). Cannon submits that the Court can rule on Mackey's breach of contract claim by
asking whether the Court presently knows any of these three things. It does not. Neither
does anyone else as a result of the comments Mr. Cannon made to the Tribune.

30

Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, claims must be
dismissed when, taking all factual allegations as true, the plaintiff is still not entitled to
any relief. See St. Benedict's Dev. Corp. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196
(Utah 1991). Moreover, "the burden [is] with the plaintiff to assert facts sufficient to
support [her] claim [s,] . . . " and the court is not "bound by conclusory allegations,
unwarranted inferences, or legal conclusions." Hackfordv. Babbit, 14 F.3d 1457, 1465
(10th Cir. 1994)(interpreting Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6))(emphasis added). Under Rule 56,
a party is entitled to summary dismissal of an action if there are no genuine issues of fact
in dispute, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Under these
plain statements of prevailing Utah law, Ms. Mackey's claims fail.
Mackey claims that in the interview with the Tribune, Cannon made the
following "unwarranted statements and allegations . . . all in violation of the confidential
Settlement Agreement:"
a.

That no hostile environment existed in Mr. Cannon's office;

b.

That there was nothing to Ms. Mackey's allegations;

c.

That Ms. Mackey's allegations had no merit;

d.

That her allegations wouldn't have held up;

e.

That there was no impropriety on Mr. Cannon's part;

f.

That Crelley Mackey has the ability to waive confidentiality;

g.

That they are not holding her to confidentiality; and
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h.

That although she isfreeto discuss it, there would be no benefit for

her to talk about it publicly.
Brief of Appellant at 8-9, citing R. at 376 and Appellant's Addendum B at ^J14. As
noted, to constitute a violation of the Settlement Agreement, the Court mustfindthat
these statements were either "confidential information" as defined by the Agreement,
terms of the settlement, or the amount of the settlement. Plainly, they are not. Rather, as
Cannon argued in the district court, these statements are all either expressions of Mr.
Cannon's opinion, or they are statements that had been made public on numerous
occasions prior to entry of the Settlement Agreement, and thus, could not, by definition,
be deemed confidential.
Mackey argues that the Settlement Agreement did not allow Mr. Cannon to
express his views and opinions. It is critical to note, however, that nowhere in the
language of the Settlement Agreement does it prohibit Mr. Cannon from expressing
those views and opinions (which are completely consistent with numerous press
statements made by Cannon prior to entry of the Settlement Agreement). Cannon was
precluded, quite explicitly, from making statements regarding "the factual and legal
allegations relating to [the Parties'] claims and disputes arising prior to the date of th[e]
Settlement Agreement...." That is all. While Ms. Mackey would like to interpret the
Settlement Agreement in the broadest possible sense to suggest that it precludes Mr.
Cannon from saying anything, it is clear that the language of the Agreement provides no
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such thing. Moreover, certainly, agreements limiting speech must be interpreted strictly,
or the most basic principle of freedom of speech would be thwarted. There has been no
breach of contract.
Examination of each of the eight allegedly offensive statements makes that
clear:
a.

"That no hostile environment existed in Mr. Cannon's office." This

statement is obviously Mr. Cannon's opinion. Critically, it is also in keeping with Ms.
Mackey's initial statements made to, and reported by the Tribune on June 29, 1997, in
which she stated that the relationship which formed the basis of her claims was "a little
minor something with two consenting adults," and in which she specifically claimed that
"she never felt harassed, threatened in her job or victimized." In addition, in the articles
that ran in the Tribune and the Deseret News prior to the signing of the Settlement
Agreement, Cannon stated no less than four times that he believed the relationship
between Mackey and Warren was consensual. R. 368-69; R. 366; R. 351-52; and R. 365.
Those statements are in complete conformity with Cannon's opinion that there was no
hostile environment in his office.
b.

"That there was nothing to Ms. Mackey's allegations." Again, this

is an expression of Mr. Cannon's opinion, which does nothing to reveal the "legal or
factual allegations relating to [the Parties'] claims and disputes," the amount of the
settlement, or the terms of the Settlement Agreement.
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c.

"That Ms. Mackey's allegations had no merit." Again, this is an

expression of Mr. Cannon's opinion, which does not reveal the "legal or factual
allegations relating to [the Parties'] claims and disputes," the amount of the settlement, or
the terms of the Settlement Agreement.
d.

"That her allegations wouldn't have held up." Again, this is an

expression of Mr. Cannon's opinion, which does not reveal the "legal or factual
allegations relating to [the Parties'] claims and disputes," the amount of the settlement, or
the terms of the Settlement Agreement.
It is important to note that of the four statements set out above, only the
first, "that there was no hostile environment in Cannon's office" was repeated in the
article printed in the Tribune. See R. 200-201 (Appellant's Addendum C). The district
court's ruling noted that the other three were never printed in the press. T. 114:15-20.
e.

"That there was no impropriety on Mr. Cannon's part." Cannon is

amazed that Ms. Mackey alleges that this statement is somehow a violation of the
Settlement Agreement. In the first place, this statement had been repeated at least six
times in the statewide press articles that ran both before and after the Settlement
Agreement was signed.5 It is absurd for Mackey to now argue that information that had

5

On July 30, 1997, the Tribune reported "Cannon is not personally accused of
inappropriate behavior." R. 353-54. On January 20, 1998, the Tribune reported "The
complaints filed on behalf of Mackey name Cannon because of his responsibility to
oversee his employees, and not because of any claims of inappropriate sexual behavior
on his part." R. 355. The Deseret News article that ran the same day similarly noted that
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been distributed literally worldwide (through Lexis/Nexis) could somehow be
transformed to "confidential information" through contractual decree.
f.

"That Crelley Mackey has the ability to waive confidentiality." First

of all, this statement again constitutes Mr. Cannon's opinion on whether he would hold
Mackey to the terms of the confidentiality provision. He stated that he would not. More
critically, however, this statement deals with matters arising after the date the Settlement
Agreement was entered. As such, it is not a disclosure of confidential information, and
cannot be a violation of the Settlement Agreement.
g.

"That they are not holding her to confidentiality." Like the

foregoing statement, this again constitutes Mr. Cannon's opinion regarding matters
arising after the date the Settlement Agreement was entered.
h.

"That although she is free to discuss it, there would be no benefit for

her to talk about it publicly." Again, this is Cannon's opinion regarding matters arising
after the Settlement Agreement was entered.
The district court's ruling on these statements is succinct and correct. The
court held:

Cannon was only named in his capacity as employer. R. 364. On February 10, 1998, the
Tribune reported again, "Cannon was not personally accused of any improper behavior,"
and significantly, therein, Mr. Hoole is quoted as saying that "as the employer, Cannon
had responsibility for the actions of his managers." R. 356. On April 16, 1998, the
Tribune again reported "Cannon was not personally accused of wrongdoing." R. 201.
The identical statement was run by the Tribune on April 17, 1998. R. 360.
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[Y]es, he did say that Crelley Mackey has the ability to waive
confidentiality and that they are not holding her to it.
However, I do not think that this amounts to a breach
of the settlement agreement. I think he merely stated a fact
that the settlement agreement is confidential [a fact that had
been printed in the press numerous times], but as far as he's
concerned, Mrs. Mackey can breach that or say what she
wants to. I don't think that that amounts to a breach of it.
And No. C [now numbered "h"] is also very similar to
that, that she's free to discuss it as she sees fit. And, again, I
think this goes to the fact that both parties are bound by it but
that Mr. Cannon, as far as he's concerned, she may discuss it
as she sees fit.
T. 113:15-114:3.
It is simply not true that the statements attributed to Mr. Cannon constituted
a violation of the Settlement Agreement. Rather, as noted above, they were either
expressions of Mr. Cannon's opinions, or they were statements that had already been
printed in the press, and thus could not be deemed confidential. These statements did not
constitute violations of the Settlement Agreement.
The only other matter then, is was Mr. Cannon allowed to go to the
Tribune, and truthfully inform the Tribune of information that had already been printed
in the Deseret News - that neither he nor any entities associated with him paid Ms.
Mackey anything in settlement of her claims? As noted above, if one omits the facts that
Mr. Hoole himself generated by taping his phone conversation with Mr. Harrie, perhaps
one could conclude that Mr. Cannon was not under the media pressure and the specific
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type of questioning that would lead to exception "e" set out in the Agreement. The Court
may recall that exception "e" reads:
thereafter, if further pressured by the media and asked
specifically whether Cannon entities or individuals
contributed money to the settlement, Mr. Cannon or his
representative may respond (after having first spoken with
Roger H. Hoole) that 'no Cannon entities or campaign
contributed to any settlement.'"
R. 408 (emphasis added). As set out above, Mr. Cannon was facing intense media
pressure, as a member of the House Judiciary Committee posed to impeach the President
of the United States on sexual harassment charges. Ms. Mackey attempts to hide those
facts from the Court, but they are explicitly set out in the conversation between Mr.
Hoole and Mr. Harrie, as noted above. Mr. Harrie informed Mr. Hoole that "a California
Democratic party operative [was] basically trying to dig up dirt on members of the
judiciary committee[,]" Cannon's office had been getting calls from reporters from The
Hill newspaper and from other reporters, and the "national press [was] looking into this
as a result of this fellow in California." R. 205-206 (Transcript 4:7-9; 4:14; 4:23 - 5:2);
and R. 208 (Transcript 7:24-25). Harrie also explicitly told Mr. Hoole that he, Mr.
Harrie, asked him, Mr. Cannon some questions. R. 207, 208 (Transcript 6:8-17; 7:7-11).
Harrie stated: "You're saying Congressman, that no money was transferred?" Id.
These facts plainly demonstrate that Mr. Cannon had the necessary pressure
and the necessary questions to repeat the information that had been printed in the Deseret
News that he had not paid Ms. Mackey to settle her claims. This was particularly
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important in light of the fact that virtually every newspaper article that had run early in
this matter referred to Cannon's attempt to "broker a settlement" by paying Mackey
$5,000.00.
Cannon admits that he did not contact Mr. Hoole prior to his meeting with
the Tribune, Mr. Hoole, at oral argument, however, conceded that he had been contacted
prior to the Deseret News article, and that the failure to contact him again was nothing
but a red herring. T. 84:5-22. The district court specifically found that Mr. Hoole
conceded that this issue was not material. R. 510. (Addendum 2).
None of Mr. Cannon's comments constituted breach of the Settlement
Agreement, and thus, the district court correctly dismissed that claim.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT MR.
CANNON DID NOT BREACH ANY COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH
AND FAIR DEALING.
Ms. Mackey pays lip service to the most basic principle governing the law

of breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing: that the covenant cannot be
construed "to establish new, independent rights or duties not agreed upon by the parties."
Brief of Appellant at 20, quoting Brown v. Moore, 1998 WL 854415 at *4-5, and Heslop
v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 840 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), and Brehany v. Nordstrom,
Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 55 (Utah 1991). In fact, that basic principle disposes of Mackey's
second cause of action.
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While she claims that she "has not sought to use the implied covenant of
good faith to establish new, independent contractual rights or duties," (Brief of Appellant
at 20), her argument one paragraph before that statement demonstrates that this is
precisely what she is attempting to do. Mackey states: "The implied covenant is
particularly pertinent here because of Mr. Cannon's claim that the Agreement does not
prevent him from expressing his 'opinions' as he did on April 15, 1998." Brief of
Appellant at 19. As has been argued extensively above, the Settlement Agreement
prohibits disclosure to third parties of "confidential information," which is explicitly
defined by the Agreement to be "the factual and legal allegations relating to [the Parties']
claims and disputes arising prior to the date of this Settlement Agreement." Nowhere
does the Settlement Agreement prohibit the expression of opinions that had either already
been printed in the press, or had to do with matters arising after the Settlement
Agreement was signed. As such, despite her protests to the contrary, Ms. Mackey indeed
asks this Court to grant her rights under an implied covenant, which she plainly was not
entitled to under the contract she signed. She asks the Court, in essence, to rewrite the
Settlement Agreement to prohibit the expression of opinions that have nothing
whatsoever to do with the underlying factual and legal allegations of the action that was
settled. The law of breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot be used
in that fashion.
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Mackey alleges that Cannon spoke "in a way that vitiated the agreed-upon
common purpose of the confidentiality clause and Ms. Mackey's justified expectations."
Brief of Appellant at 20. The "agreed-upon common purpose of the confidentiality
clause," however, is clearfromthe terms of the clause itself- the parties could not and
would not disclose the factual and legal theories underlying Mackey's claims. Cannon
readily admits that this purpose was important to the parties, because the facts and the
nature of the evidence underlying Ms. Mackey's claims could certainly prove to be
embarrassing for any of the parties. Those facts, however, remain strictly confidential.
Cannon did not breach "the agreed-upon common purpose of the confidentiality clause."
Mackey further argues that the district court erred because it is "readily
apparent" that the following allegations "are factual and legal allegations regarding
settled, mooted and confidential matters[:]" 1) that no hostile environment existed in
Cannon's office, 2) that there was nothing to her allegations, 3) that her allegations had
no merit, and 4) that her allegations would not have held up. Brief of Appellant at 21.
That determination, however, again goes squarely to the breach of contract claim, as it
requires nothing but interpretation of the terms of the Settlement Agreement. As noted
above, the first statement had been repeated in the press many times. The court found
that none of the remaining statements were even printed in the press (T. 114:14-20), and
even if they had been, they plainly do not disclose anything confidential. If Ms. Mackey
genuinely believes that these statements violate the terms of the agreement she signed,
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Cannon submits that her "justified expectations" in this regard are simply not
"objectively reasonable."
Finally, Mackey claims that she ought to prevail on her implied covenant
claim because Mr. Cannon acted "on an unreasonable interpretation of a contract
t e r m . . . . " Brief of Appellant at 22. Once again, however, this goes directly to the
contract claim. If the Court found that Cannon's interpretation of the Settlement
Agreement was unreasonable, Mackey would prevail on her breach of contract claim,
and the implied covenant could do nothing but create new rights not granted by the
contract. Likewise, if Cannon's interpretation of the Settlement Agreement is correct,
then any alteration of that interpretation under the implied covenant could only be
creating rights not granted by the contract itself, which is prohibited under Utah law.
At the district court, Ms. Mackey claimed that Cannon believed he was
"free to say virtually anything he feels is appropriate about the factual and legal
allegations relating to the settled claims and disputes

" R. 394. Although she is not

so strident before this Court, the implication is the same. Mr. Cannon fully recognizes
that the Settlement Agreement entered in this matter precluded, quite explicitly,
discussion of "the factual and legal allegations relating to [the Parties'] claims and
disputes arising prior to the date of th[e] Settlement Agreement

" Mr. Cannon further

acknowledges that the Settlement Agreement precluded discussion of "the terms of the
settlement or the amount of the payments made under the Agreement, except [as outlined
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above.]" The comments Cannon made, however, did not encroach on the factual or legal
allegations of the prior dispute, nor did they disclose terms of, or any amount of
settlement.
It is quite critical to note that the Court is not now aware, any more than it
would have been prior to Mr. Cannon's meeting with the Tribune, of the factual and/or
legal allegations at issue in the prior case raised by Ms. Mackey. The Court has no idea
of the amount that was paid in settlement; it only knows that Mr. Cannon and his
associated entities paid nothing - which it could have discovered through the
February 11, 1998 article published in the Deseret News. As such, Ms. Mackey's
invocation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing can be nothing but an
attempt to manufacture rights she was not granted by the Settlement Agreement.
Cannon has not, in any way, acted in bad faith with respect to Ms. Mackey.
Rather, he has operated in complete conformity with the Settlement Agreement, in a
manner Ms. Mackey simply does not like. That does not constitute breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Cannon was being pressured by media sources to determine whether he had
paid any monies in settlement with Ms. Mackey. That information had been printed in
the Deseret News earlier, but in light of the media pressure, Cannon felt it was necessary
to reiterate the point. Ms. Mackey was not remotely harmed by the repeat of information
that was already public information. The only way she could establish a claim is if the
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implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing granted her rights the Settlement
Agreement does not. As a matter of law, the implied covenant cannot do so, and the
district court correctly dismissed this claim.
CONCLUSION
Congressman Cannon did not breach either the express contract at issue in
this case or any implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing associated with that
contract. The district court correctly dismissed Mackey's claims, and that dismissal
should be upheld.
DATED this 30th day of August, 1999.
WOOD CRAPO LLC

Mary Anne Q. Wood
Sheri A. Mower
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees
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1

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; TUESDAY, JULY 2 8 ,

8:00

A.M.

-oooOooo-

2

THE COURT:

3

The matter before the Court is the

4

case of Crelley Mackey versus Chris Cannon and others. The

5

plaintiff's present and ready to proceed?
MR. HOOLE:

6

Yes, Your Honor.

7

Heather Morrison for Ms. Mackey.

8

present today.

Roger Hoole and

Ms. Mackey is also

THE COURT: And the defense?

9

MS. WOOD:

10

Your Honor, Mary Anne Wood on behalf

11

of the Cannon entities that have been served.

12

joined momentarily by an associate, Sheri Mower.
THE COURT:

13

I'll be

Now, a motion has been filed by the

14

Kearns Tribune Corporation —

15

Lake Tribune.

I'll just call it the Salt

Are they going to be present?

MS. SONNENREICH:

16

Yes, we are, Your Honor.

17

Sharon Sonnenreich, General Counsel to the Salt Lake

18

Tribune.

19

21
22
23
24
25

Ifm

And with me is Michael O'Brien, who's from Jones,

Waldo.
THE COURT:

20

I

1998,

Now, we have three or four motions.

Any priority as far as the motions, or do you want me to
set it?
MS. WOOD:

Your Honor, it seems to me it makes

sense to have our motion to dismiss heard first, because
everything else would be rendered moot, I think, by that

motion.
MR. HOOLE:

I would suggest, Your Honor, that the

motion to amend be heard first.

It impacts all of the

other motions and frames the controversies.
MS. WOOD:
motion to amend.
is necessary.

Your Honor, we don't object to the

In fact, we don't think a motion to amend

We've never answered this complaint.

The

rule's quite clear, you can amend one time as a matter of
right.

We pointed that out in our initial motion to

dismiss, that they were free to amend.

So I don't —

I

don't see that there's any controversy with respect to
whether or not they have a right to amend.
We have moved to dismiss both with respect to the
original complaint and with respect to the amended
complaint.
THE COURT:

Based on that, I would say that your

motion to amend is granted.
MR. HOOLE:

Thank you, Your Honor.

I think the

next motion, then, would be our motion for an enlargement
of time in which to respond to the motion to amend
excuse me —

—

the motion to dismiss.

THE COURT:

And I would feel that the motion to

dismiss was filed first on that, and I will allow them to
argue that.

Do you wish to argue your motions for

enlargement, if you —

1
2

MR. HOOLE:

I would like to argue that, Your

THE COURT:

Well, I mean with their motion, but I

Honor.

3
4

would allow them to proceed on their motion to dismiss

5

MR. HOOLE:

Thank you, Your Honor.

6

THE COURT:

—

7

M S . WOOD:

first on that matter.

Your Honor, the plaintiff in this

8

matter initially filed its complaint on April 16th, 1998.

9

Our motion to dismiss the original complaint was filed May

10

7th, 1998.

11

complaint failed to state a claim upon which any relief can

12

be granted.

That motion pointed out that plaintiff's

Plaintiff has never filed a responsive motion to

13
14

this motion to dismiss.

15

a motion for enlargement of time and an amended complaint,

16

which w e , in our very first pleading in this case, said,

17

"If you want to file an amended complaint, go ahead.

18

rules permit you to file an amended complaint one time as a

19

matter of right before we've answered the complaint."

In fact, all he has done is filed

The

We are now four months past the time when the

20

©

—

21

complaint was originally filed, three months from the

22

time —

23

two and a half months from the time we filed a motion to

24

dismiss.

25

filed to that motion to dismiss.

excuse m e , two months from the time that we f i l e d —

And at this point, there has been no response
And we believe that we

are entitled to this motion as a matter of default, because
they have failed to respond, have failed to provide any
reasons why this complaint should not be granted.
Their only response seems to be that they need
time to do discovery to see if they have a cause of action.
And, Your Honor, we submit that that is not consistent with
Rule 11, that you have to have at least enough information
to be able to state a claim in order to file a lawsuit and,
if you don't, you're not permitted to file a lawsuit that
doesn't state a claim in order to file discovery to see if
you might possibly have a claim.
Thus, we think that this —

if the Court chooses

to reach the merits of a motion to dismiss, which we don't
think you have to because of the failure to respond, what
we are dealing with here is a complaint aimlessly wandering
around looking for a cause of action and a plaintiff who is
doing the same.
I think we are dealing with the amended complaint
at this point, Your Honor, because we —

in response to the

amended complaint, renewed our arguments concerning the
original complaint.

And the amended complaint makes a

number of material concessions.
First of all, it concedes, as it had to, that it
had no claim for tortious interference with contract.

It

then, for the first time, purports to make some allegations

1

of the claims that it says constitute its other —

the

2

factual support for its other causes of action.

3

are found in the amended complaint on page 3, where they

4

set forth the terms of the alleged contract between the

5

parties which we had already conceded and placed in our

6

responsive motion.

7

forth the purported representations of Mr. Cannon that they

8

say support their causes of action —

9

paragraph 14 —

And these

And then on page 4, where they set

and this is page 4,

that Crelley Mackey has the ability to

10

waive confidentiality, but they are not holding her to the

11

confidentiality; that although she is free to discuss it,

12

there would be no benefit to her to talk about it publicly;

13

that there was no impropriety on Mr. Cannon's part; that no

14

hostile environment existed in Mr. Cannon's office; that

15

there was nothing to Ms. Mackey's allegations; that

16

Ms. Mackeyfs allegations had no merit; and that her

17

allegations wouldn't have held up.

18

Now, Your Honor, conceding those facts that those

19

statements were made by Mr. Cannon, the complaint still

20

fails to state a cause of action.

21

back from the easiest causes of action first.

22

And I'd like to work

First of all, she has alleged defamation.

Now,

23

defamation has to be pled with particularity.

And,

24

obviously, the claims for defamation have to be something

25

that impugns somebody's reputation.

I look at that

paragraph 14, Your Honor, and I defy anybody to find any
statement there that is defamatory.
defamatory, it is —

But even if it were

they are undeniably true, because

Mr. Cannon was expressing his opinion.

He was willing to

have Ms. Mackey waive confidentiality if she chose to do so
and wanted to talk about her allegations.
Mr. Cannon was not going to hold her to the
confidentiality agreement, that she was free to discuss it,
but he didn't believe that there would be a benefit to her
talking about it publicly.

That is indisputably

Mr. Cannon's opinion and his opinion was that she was free
to discuss it if she wanted to.
on Mr. Cannon's part.

There was no impropriety

Your Honor, that is also

indisputably true and was already in numerous newspaper
articles concerning the allegations of Ms. Mackey's
complaint, that she did not accuse Mr. Cannon of any
impropriety.

There was nothing to Ms. Mackey's

allegations.

Once again, that's not defamatory.

Ms. Mackeyfs allegations had no merit.

But

Once again, that

was Mr. Cannon's opinion and he was free to say it.

That

her allegations wouldn't have held up, once again,
Mr. Cannon's opinion, and he was free to say it.
On its face, there is nothing there that could,
on ciny reasonable or conceivable basis, constitute
defamation under Utah law.

Now, let's look at the question of privacy.

She

has also made allegations concerning the disclosure of
private facts, apparently.

And we have set forth in our

opening memorandum the elements of Utah law to meet that.
In order to establish a claim for public
disclosure of private facts, the disclosure of the facts
must be a public disclosure.

We admit this was a public

disclosure.
The facts disclosed to the public must be private
facts not public ones.

Your Honor, there is nothing in

that list on page 14 that was not previously wellpublicized.

In fact, Ms. Mackey's own newspaper interviews

made those facts clearly public.
A matter made public must be one that would be
highly offensive and objectionable to the person of
ordinary sensibilities.
Your Honor.

That test simply can't be met,

It is not uncommon for litigants to say that

they don't think the other side's position had any merit.
That's not highly objectionable or offensive in our
society.
And, finally, the public must have a legitimate
interest in the information made available.

Now, the core

of the disclosure by Mr. Cannon was that he did not pay any
money to have Ms. Mackey's lawsuit or claims settled or
dismissed.

There was clearly a public interest in that.

1

In fact, the settlement agreement of the parties permitted

2

him to make that disclosure.

3

public to understand that no public monies and no monies

4

from their congressman were used to settle this lawsuit.

5

So the allegations of the amended complaint simply do not

6

meet the test of disclosure of private facts.

It was very important for the

The only other privacy claim she makes is false

7
8

light.

And to meet the test of false light invasion of

9

privacy, you have to give publicity to a matter concerning

10

another before the public in a false light.

11

light in which the other place would be highly offensive to

12

a reasonable person and the actor had knowledge or acted in

13

reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized

14

matter and the false light which the other would be placed.

15

Your Honor, I have with me a few of the newspaper

16

articles, including interviews with Ms. Mackey in which she

17

concedes every single one of the points alleged in

18

paragraph 14 of her complaint.

19

sexual harassment,' said Cannon, who acknowledged he never

20

asked for the investigator's conclusions and didn't want to

21

know them."

22

opinion.

23

The false

'"I don't believe there was

That's a prior disclosure of Mr. Cannon's

Ms. Mackey saying, "'There was some context,' she

24

insists, but she never felt harassed, threatened or

25

victimized."

That's Ms. Mackey's own disclosure of those

10

facts.
The Deseret News —

and that is an article from

the Salt Lake Tribune of June 29th.

The Deseret News

carried an article prior to this article in the Tribune:
"If asked, Rep. Chris Cannon is willing to repeat that no
money was paid to settle a lawsuit by a former aide, who
claims she was sexually harassed by a co-worker, but
despite a new lawsuit accusing Cannon of violating the
confidentiality provisions of the earlier settlement by
disclosing its terms."
Deseret News, February 11th, 1998:

"Cannon's

current chief of staff, Steve Taggert, said that Cannon did
not pay any money personally to Mackey as part of the final
settlement.

He said that the settlement was reached

without any admission of liability or payment of monies
from Chris Cannon or the use of tax dollars."
Your Honor, there cannot be any false light under
these circumstances when the facts stated by Mr. Cannon in
the Tribune article were indisputably already public and
indisputably true.
Now we get to the emotional distress claim.

And

it's clear that the allegations of the amended complaint do
not begin to meet the test under Utah law of intentional
infliction of emotional distress. And I'm quoting from the
Dubois

v. Grand Central

case, where:

"The defendant

11

intentionally engaged in some conduct toward the plaintiff
with a purpose of inflicting emotional distress where any
reasonable person would have knowledge that such would be
the result, his actions are such a nature as to be
considered outrageous and intolerable in that they offend
against the generally-accepted standards of decency and
morality.

Liability may be found only in those cases where

the conduct has been so outrageous in character, so extreme
in degree as to go beyond the bounds of decency and to be
regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a
civilized society."
Your Honor, the facts of the complaint do not
rise to that level. Mr. Cannon having an interview with a
court reporter and disclosing what was indisputably true
information cannot be intentional infliction of emotional
distress because it cannot be considered to be outrageous
and intolerable in a civilized society.
That, then, brings us to the —

to, really, the

core of the complaint, and that is the question of the
breach of contract.

And in the amended complaint,

Mr. Cannon sets forth for the first time the provisions of
the contract that she claims were violated.

And that's

found at page 3, paragraph 10 of the complaint.
"The parties agree that the factual and legal
allegations relating to their claims and disputes arising

12

prior to the date of the settlement agreement shall be
confidential and that they shall not disclose to any third
party that confidential information."
The language there, I think, is critical, "The
parties agree that the factual and legal allegations
relating to their claims and disputes."
Your Honor, it would be ironic if I had to
disclose to Your Honor in this argument the factual and
legal allegations relating to the claims that arose prior
to the settlement in order to prove that there was no
breach of the contract.

But let me just turn your

attention back to paragraph 4 of the amended complaint and
the allegations set forth in —

I mean, in page 4,

paragraph 14, the allegations set forth there.

And, Your

Honor, I think it is very clear that Mr. Cannon did not
discuss the factual or legal allegations relating to the
claims and disputes of the parties arising to the date of
settlement.
He did express his own opinions arising after the
date of settlement concerning whether he was going to hold
Ms. Mackey to the terms of the confidentiality agreement,
notifying the press that, in his opinion, she was free to
discuss it if she wanted to, the fact that there was no
impropriety on Cannon's part, which is an opinion which was
expressed in the newspapers prior to the lawsuit, and

13

simply does not constitute a disclosure of the facts and
the legal claims.
Now, I can tell Your Honor that there were some
very, very embarrassing facts in this lawsuit.

And if we

have to go to trial on whether Mr. Cannon's statements were
a breach of contract, then there will be a disclosure of
the facts and the claims of the parties.

But I don't think

that's necessary today, because I think it is clear on its
face, if you hold the language of the settlement agreement
up against the statements that were allegedly made by
Mr. Cannon, that there was no breach, because he did not
disclose any facts and he didn't disclose any legal claims
in the article.
Now, that gets down to the question that seems to
make Ms. Mackey particularly unhappy, and that is the fact
that Mr. Cannon disclosed that he hadn't paid any money.
And, Your Honor, once again, I call your attention to the
February 11th, 1998 newspaper article in the Deseret News
in which that disclosure had already been made.

And that

disclosure had been made after talking to Mr. Hoole, as the
settlement agreement required.
Now, the question really technically gets down to
the fact of whether the disclosure be made again without
being told to Mr. Hoole that it was going to be made,
because Mr. Hoole had no capacity under the terms of the

14

settlement agreement to quarrel with whether or not the
disclosure was made.

And I invite Your Honor to look back

again to the amended complaint where that language is set
forth, but the language of the complaint makes it perfectly
clear that Mr. Cannon is free, after talking to Roger
Hoole, to disclose that no Cannon entities or campaign
contributed to the settlement.
That was information he was free to disclose to
the public.

He was free to disclose it if he had pressure

from the press.

I think it's very interesting that the

transcript which Mr. Hoole has provided us of his
conversation with Mr. Harry makes clear that Mr. Cannon was
getting pressure from the press.
"Chris Cannon serves on that committee, and this
subject of the Crelley case has come up, and I guess
they've had some calls in recent days about that. And, as
it turns out, I guess the Deseret News had a story about
the settlement as well, and I didn't see it.

I was

covering the legislature.
"HARRY —
"HARRY:

HOOLE:

Yeah, I don't even remember.

I don't either, but apparently it said

no money was paid out as part of the settlement.

The

Deseret News is not on Lexis Nexus, which is a lot of what
the reporters and others use to get information.
Apparently, there's been something in the last few days on

15

Capitol Hill in which a newspaper that covers Capitol
Hill..." and so forth.
It's clear that Mr. Cannon made the disclosure a
second time because of pressure he was receiving.

And the

information he disclosed was indisputably true.
And returning again to the transcript provided by
Mr. Hoole on page 7:
both.

"Well, I think it's a little bit of

You know, we talked about it.

He said something to

the effect, 'I'm talking about entities I'm associated with
not other entities.' And so I said something to the
effect —

I asked the question, 'Well, so there's no string

back to you or any of the entities with which you're
associated that deal with this case that there was a
payment and a settlement.'"
And he said, "Absolutely not."
That was information that Mr. Cannon, under the
terms of the settlement agreement, was free to disclose.
He did not give Mr. Hoole a second phone call.

And I would

submit, Your Honor, in light of the earlier disclosure, at
most, that is an immaterial breach.
Now, finally, we have a claim in this lawsuit for
punitive damages.
THE COURT:

Before you leave that, this

conversation that he had with Mr. Hoole, now when was that
supposed to have taken place?

16

MS. WOOD:

Mr. Harry called Mr. Hoole after his

interview with Mr. Cannon to get a comment from Mr. Hoole.
THE COURT:

But you said that Mr. Cannon talked

to Mr. Hoole.
MS. WOOD:

Mr. Cannon talked to Mr. Harry.

And

Mr. Harry's relating to Mr. Hoole the pressure that
Mr. Cannon was feeling and the reason for his interview
with Mr. Harry.
THE COURT:

Oh, Mr. Cannon never talked to

Mr. Hoole prior to any disclosure?
MS. WOOD:

He did, Your Honor, when the

disclosure was made to the Deseret News.
THE COURT: Okay.
MS. WOOD:

Which article was published and which

I read from —
THE COURT: Yes.
MS. WOOD:

—

on February 11th, 1998. Mr. Hoole

was called and notified prior to that interview.

He was

not called and notified prior to the interview with
Mr. Harry.

And I would say, at most, that could be nothing

more than a material breach, because Mr. Hoole had no right
to boycott under the plain terms of the agreement; all he
had was a right to knowledge.

And he received that

knowledge before the interview with the Deseret News.
Finally, we have a claim for punitive damages

17

1

here, Your Honor, and although Mr. Hoole has not chosen to

2

put the full settlement agreement into the record, we have

3

put enough of it in in our motion to dismiss for Your Honor

4

to see that there was a liquidated damages provision in

5

this contract which limited damages to $10,000 to the non-

6

j breaching parties.

A total of $10,000 to the non-breaching

7

parties.

8

punitive damages here or any other damages except for the

9
10
11

liquidated damages of $10,000, which would have to be
shared among all the non-breaching parties, and there were
about ten parties to this settlement agreement.
But, Your Honor, we think it is clear that this

12
13
14
15

There could not be any possible claim for

complaint, on its face, has failed to state a claim.
was no defamation.
true.

There

Everything that was said was clearly

There couldn't be any false light or disclosure of

16

private facts.

Everything that Mr. Cannon said was already

17

a matter of public knowledge.

18

intentional infliction of emotional distress.

19

be such a restraint on the communications in the media.

20

is so common for litigants and others to talk about their

21

opinions about the other person's position.

22

not disclose any of the underlying facts of this claim of

23

Ms. Mackey's, nor any of her theories, nor any of the

24

theories of his defenses or the facts that gave rise to his

25

defenses, although we will do that, Your Honor, if this

There could not be any
That would
It

Mr. Cannon did

18

case proceeds.
And, finally, it is clear that he had a right to
disclose the information he disclosed and that Mr. Hoole
has not alleged he didn't receive notice of it prior to the
Deseret News article.
On that basis, we don't think there's a claim
here and the lawsuit ought to be dismissed.
MR. HOOLE:
controversy here.

Your Honor, we have quite a

And to hear Counsel explain the case

makes me pause because it is completely different from how
I understand it.
The Court has granted our motion to amend and,
therefore, all of the allegations in our motion to amend
are deemed true for purposes of this hearing.
I do want to state on the record that we have
filed a motion for an enlargement of time in which to
respond to the motion to dismiss for the reasons stated in
that motion to enlarge.

And with respect to particularly

the liquidated damages issue, I believe that we need to
brief that.

I'd also like to brief the issues regarding

the privacy claim and the intentional infliction claim.
But I think much of what Ms. Wood has said today
is mooted by our motion to amend.

And let me first

indicate that with respect to the defamation claim which
was in the original complaint, that has been dropped.

That
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was dropped, although there was an inadvertent reference,
the word "defamation" appears one time on page 6 of our
amended complaint.
here, Your Honor.

There are no allegations of defamation
And let me explain why there are no

allegations of defamation and no defamation claim in the
first —

in the amended complaint.
Your Honor, this entire controversy and dispute

was settled.

By settling it, the parties agreed that they

would withhold their opinions, that they would not discuss
it, and that we would not get into the facts, controversies
and disputes that led to the settlement.

We had to drop

our defamation claim because that would have necessarily
caused us to get into whether or not the allegations, the
claims, the defenses, the disputes were true or whether
they were not true.

And that is not the purpose of our

case, and Counsel's suggestion that all that needs to come
out in this case is simply an effort, I believe, to
intimidate my client.

I don't think it's appropriate.

Your Honor, we had no defamation case, and most
of her argument hinges on that.

And I would suggest that

that's a red herring and we need to look at the other
claims.
But let me first start, if I might, with a very
brief factual chronology, because I think it's important
for the Court to understand the facts as they relate to the
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1

pending motions.

And I will be a little bit broad with my

2

recitation of the facts, because I don't want to have to go

3

over this unnecessarily when we address the other motions

4

before the Court today.
On February 9th, the parties entered into a

5
6

settlement agreement which was confidential.

There were

7

approximately ten parties to that agreement.

Not all of

8

the parties were represented.

9

here today.

Not all of the parties are

Some of the parties who were a part of that

10

settlement agreement are insistent that it not be breached

11

in terms of its confidentiality.
Mr. Cannon can only speak for himself.

12

If he

13

wants to be able to speak about it, that's his decision,

14

that is not a decision that is binding on the other

15

parties.

16

freely speak about this, that is completely erroneous.

17

There are other parties to this case which will not allow

18

that.

19

So when there is a statement that Ms. Mackey can

Now, let me read the agreement language that is

20

critical here, because I think it is essential that the

21

Court understand that we brought this controversy into a

22

settlement and agreed that it would be forever resolved.

23

It says:

"The parties agree that the factual and

24

legal allegations relating to their claims and disputes" —

25

and disputes —

"arising prior to the date of this

21

! I settlement agreement shall be confidential and that they
2

j shall not disclose to any third party that confidential

3

information, except to their attorneys, therapists, tax

4

advisers or as required by law, or to disclose on Monday,

5

February 9, 1998 that M s . Mackey's claims have been

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

resolved to the parties 1 satisfaction."
And thereafter, there was a provision, and it's
not in my summary here.

Thereafter, if there was pressure

from the media, Mr. Cannon would be free to state that he
nor any entities associated with him paid any money in
connection with the settlement.

And that was done.

They

called me and that was done in the Deseret News on the 11th
of February, as Counsel has suggested.
But the language goes on, and it says:
"Thereafter, if further pressured by the media and asked
specifically whether Mr. Cannon, entities" —

excuse m e ,

"whether the Cannon entities or individuals contributed to

18

the settlement, Mr. Cannon or his representatives may

19

respond after having spoken with Roger Hoole, that no

20

Cannon entities or campaign contribution —

21

entities or campaign contributed to the settlement."

22

And we have no problem with that.

no Cannon

The Cannon

23

entities and M r . Cannon did not pay to settle this case.

24

That's not the issue here.

25

not the whole story, but that's not the issue here.

That's a red herring.

That is

22

"Other than as specifically allowed here, the
parties and their attorneys shall not volunteer any
confidential information And, in response to any request
for information by any party or entity, shall say only 'No
comment.1"

That was expressly agreed.

That was expressly

agreed.
And so the parties resolved their dispute; the
statement to the press was made.

I received no further

call alerting me that there was pressure from the media.
Rather, on April 15th, as I sat in my office in the
afternoon, I received a call from Dan Harry at the Salt
Lake Tribune.

And I know Dan and it was not unusual for me

to receive a call from him.

But as soon as I realized that

he was talking about Chris Cannon and Crelley Mackey, a
matter that had been resolved and settled and made
confidential by the parties, in order to protect my client,
I recorded the conversation and it was transcribed by a
certified court reporter.

And this is a portion, just a

portion, of what it says.
"MR. HOOLE:

Chris Cannon was in your office

"MR. HARRY:

He was in our office and,

today?

immediately, Chris wanted to start talking about the
Crelley Mackey case.
"MR. HOOLE:

Really?
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"MR. HARRY:

I swear to you, I didn't bring it

"MR. HOOLE:

Really?

"MR. HARRY:

And what he wanted to get out there

up.

is the fact that, through the congressional office, through
the campaign, Cannon Industries has paid no money at all in
terms of settlement.
"MR. HOOLE:

And he just volunteered that?

"MR. HARRY:

Oh, absolutely.

I mean, he's

telling me this stuff and went into some detail and
basically said, 'Now, I'm not saying that you need to run a
story on this.
didn't.'

In fact, you know, I'd just as soon you

But I mean, obviously, he's not telling me this

stuff on the record so that I don't write his story.
"So, now, were you on the —

this is by me:

So,

now, were you on the record or off?
"MR. HARRY:

No.

This was all on the record.

"MR. HOOLE:

This is no confidential source,

nothing like that?
"MR. HARRY:
Cannon.
it.

Absolutely not.

This was from Chris

And two other reporters were in there and heard

You know, there's just no question about that.
"MR. HARRY:

Mr. Cannon said that Chris Mackey

has the ability to waive confidentiality.
holding her to confidentiality.

We're not

And he went on to say

24

<l | basically, though, that
2 I
3
4

7

8
9

J

"MR. HARRY:

12

I

"MR. HARRY:

for her to talk about this publicly."
And I think that's a very critical statement.
"Crelley was free to discuss it, but there would be no
benefit in that for her to talk about this publicly."
I'll come back to that.
"And I'm going to have to go back to the tape and
get the exact wording and everything.

16

22
23
24
25

He's raising a lot of interesting

"MR. HARRY:

Yeah.

paid a nickel.

No entity associated with me

There wasn't a hostile environment."

Remember, Your Honor, we resolved all disputes,

20
21

"MR. HOOLE:
questions.

18
19

you know, that Crelley was

free to discuss it but there would be no benefit in that

14

17

And,

But, anyway, he said something to

the effect that there was —

13

15

I'm looking at my notes.

actually, we have this on tape as well.

10
11

It sounds like you're looking at

your notes,

5
6

"MR. HOOLE:

—

not just factual claims.

We resolved all disputes.

The

settlement agreement says claims and disputes were
resolved.

The parties' opinions on this matter were to be

held confidentially.
was part of our deal.

They weren't to be expressed.

That

But anyway, he goes on.

25

"There was no impropriety on my part, no hostile

1
2

environment.

There was nothing.

Nothing came home to

3

roost.

4

have it specifically in my notes, but I will soon, that it

5

basically —

6

they had no merit.

And, basically, the message was that —

I don't

there was nothing to the allegations and that
They would not have held up."

7

"And that's on tape?

8

"MR. HARRY:

9

Your Honor, then he wanted a response from me,

Uh-huh."

10

and I couldn't give it because we'd settled the agreement.

11

We had agreed to keep our opinions, our claims, our

12

disputes confidential.

13

Congress, politician, an attorney, a multi-millionaire,

14

someone with enormous power, someone who can walk in to the

15

Tribune and have three reporters drop everything that

16

they're doing and listen to what he says and write his

17

story, says these things, and my client, a typical citizen,

18

has no recourse.

19

stuff's printed in the newspaper.

20

And yet a man, a member of

She has nothing she can do, but this

Your Honor, that's the background of this case.

21

The tape goes on.

And because I won't respond to Mr.

22

Harry's questions, I asked him for a copy of the tape.

23

he indicates that those tapes are frequently destroyed and

24

he's not going to be able to provide me one.

25

obvious to me that he is going to destroy that tape if I

And

And it's

26

don't get a subpoena issued right away.

So the next day,

on Tuesday morning, we filed suit and subpoenaed the same
date the tapes and the notes to preserve that evidence.
Because it was contemporaneous evidence of what was
actually said and it was not from a confidential source.
So we are attacked for lack of specificity in our
first complaint.

And we are attacked because we don't get

into a lot of facts in our first complaint.
for that is obvious, Your Honor.

We had to urgently file.

We were under a confidentiality clause.
be said in court.

And the reason

Very little could

But I submit that the amended —

that

the first complaint, as well as the amended complaint are
well-pleaded and it provides adequate notice to the
opposing party that we claim breaches.
Now, the breaches that we talk about have been
roughly referred to by Counsel.
are —

they are matters —

And I submit that they

whether or not they are true,

they are matters which were in dispute and settled.
that's the point.

And

And the statements which were made —

at

least some of the statements which were made include that
Crelley Mackey has the ability to waive confidentiality.
That is not true.
That they are not holding her to confidentiality.
Well, who is they?

There are unknown parties to this

settlement agreement which are holding her to
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confidentiality.

So Mr. Cannon is not in a position to

state that, without creating great misrepresentations in
the record.
That she is free to discuss it but that there
would be no benefit to her in talking about it publicly.
That suggests —

that suggests so much, that she has been—

so much wrong that she has been unable to respond to.
That there was no impropriety on Mr. Cannon's
part.

Well, that might have been a dispute that was

resolved, Your Honor.
allegations.

That there was nothing to the

And here is an attorney, a politician, a

congressman rendering a legal opinion in the newspaper as
to the merits of her claims that were settled, and it is
outrageous.

He knew that that was going to be published.

He knew that they were going to listen to him.

There was

no call to me so I could say, "Mr. Cannon, you've got to
remember what you signed.

You cannot say any more than

what is in the quote marks in this settlement agreement.
That's what we agreed to."
It's not that I could stop him from saying
things, but I wanted to have the right —

and that's why it

was built into the settlement agreement, to say,
"Mrw Cannon, you cannot say more than this."
remind him of that.

I wanted to

Because his reputation is no more

important than my client's.
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Your Honor, a lot has been said that needs to be
responded to. And perhaps I should address the specific
elements of our claims.

The first claim in our amended

complaint is a breach of contract.

I'd submit that there

is, on its face, a clear breach of contract and that the
breaches are material and that they are injurious to my
client.

The breach of contract claim has to be accepted

and the allegations have to be accepted as true for
purposes of a motion to dismiss.
THE COURT:

Tell me more about this conversation

Mr. Cannon had with you prior to the Deseret News article.
MR. H00LE:

Actually, the conversation was not

with me and Mr. Cannon, it was with one of his aides.

One

of his aides called me and said that there was pressure and
that they may go to the press.

They didn't tell me that

they were going to talk to the Deseret News or put an
article in the Deseret News.
been there.

I didn't even know it had

But, basically, this was right after we had

settled within the context of this progressive disclosure
that we had agreed to.

If the pressure mounted to such a

point that he had to make a statement, he was free to make
a statement.

And I have no objection, Your Honor.

I

haven't read the Deseret News article, but I have no
objection to his saying what I believe was probably
permitted by the settlement agreement in that article.

I
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-I i haven't read the article.
2

I

But what I do have a problem with is this second
disclosure, months later, after this file was collecting

3
4

J dust in everybody's office.

5

,

6

I with you be sufficient to meet the criterion of the

7

THE COURT:

contract months later?
MR. HOOLE:

8
9
10
11
12

Would the contact that the aide had

No.

No.

required two contacts with me.
concede, occurred.

The settlement agreement
The first contact, I will

I didn't know it was going to result in

an article in the Deseret News.

But that happened.

My

understanding, frankly, is that they weren't going to do
anything, but they had the right to talk to the Deseret

13
News if they felt pressured.
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

My concern is the second contact.
the second incident.

There was

—

They never contacted me and said, "We

are going to go unannounced to the Tribune, me and some
staff members.
That was —

And we are going to give them our story."

I had no idea that was going to happen.

And if

I had, I would have cautioned them very, very vigorously
not to violate the settlement agreement.
Your Honor, these settlement agreements are
certainly favored by the court, as the Court knows, and the
confidentiality of these settlement agreements is so
integral to these things.

And what is happening here just
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1

absolutely violates the whole purpose of settling these

2

cases.

3

party —

4

agreement —

5

that he can —

6

ability to respond to those allegations.

11
12
13
14
15
16
17

decides that his reputation is so important
he can smear others when others have no

You're saying that he had the right

to say what he said if he talked to you ahead of time.

8

10

one out of many parties to a settlement

THE COURT:

7

9

And now we're involved in litigation because one

J

MR. HOOLE:

No, Your Honor, I'm not saying that.

And I'm glad the Court asked for clarification on that.
The only thing that he could have said under the terms of
the settlement agreement is, quote —
If further —

and let me read it.

this is after the first disclosure to the

Deseret News.

If further pressured by the media and asked

specifically whether the Cannon entities or individuals
contributed money to the settlement, Mr. Cannon or his
representatives may respond, after having spoken with Roger

18

Hoole that, quote, "No Cannon entities or campaign

19

contributed to any settlement," close quote.

20

That's what he was allowed to say.

21

we agreed upon.

22

say, quote, "no comment."

23

had said that, that would —

24

But that's not what was said.

25

flagrantly violated the —

That's what

And thereafter, they are only allowed to
And that's our problem.

If he

we wouldn't be here today.
He went far beyond that and

the settlement agreement and his
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1

conduct constitutes independent tortious conduct.

2

far beyond a mere breach.
He states, Your Honor —

3

It went

he states to the

4

Tribune —

and, of course, we've been prevented from

5

confirming any of this.

6

"Crelley was free to discuss it, but there would be no

7

benefit in that for her to talk about this publicly."

But he states to the Tribune,

Chris Cannon knows Crelley Mackey is prevented

8
9

from talking about this publicly, and then suggests that,

10

for some untoward reason, she wouldn't want to talk about

11

it anyway.

12

going to cause her real problems.

13

says it anyway and then publicizes it like that.

He knows that this is a loaded comment that is

I submit to you —

14

And it has.

And yet he

I submit to the Court that

15

that is an egregious act.

16

offends morality and decency as we know it.

17

settlement agreements; confidentiality clauses are integral

18

parts of settlement agreements.

19

nothing to deserve this.

20

is bound.

21

to come to this court and seek damages for the injury to

22

her reputation, because the parties agreed that the

23

disputes between them would not be discussed and that they

24

would not express their opinions, let alone to the press.

25

That is an egregious act which
Courts favor

Ms. Mackey has done

The matter was resolved and she

She cannot talk about this.

Her only claim is

So I submit that whatever facts there may have
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been were made private and that Mr. Cannon's public

2 I disclosure of those facts, as acknowledged by Counsel, is
3

actionable and that she has in fact been damaged.

4
5

6
7
8
9

These people were not litigants, as Counsel
suggests, when this disclosure was made.
their dispute.

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

25

This was not a matter of public

Not appropriately, anyway.

But it was made

Your Honor, this conduct has —

and we haven't

had an opportunity to respond to the motion to dismiss, but
with respect to the privacy claim, I would submit that the
Court, having granted our motion to amend, needs to accept
our allegations as true for purposes of this motion, and
that there were public disclosures involving private
information which the public has no legitimate interest in
knowing and that with respect to the infliction of
emotional distress claim, that Mr. Cannon acted
intentionally, or at least with a reckless disregard of
causing emotional distress to Crelley Mackey, and violating
all of the notions of fairness and decency and those things
that our system is based on.

23
24

They

public by Mr. Cannon, and wrongfully so.

10
11

There had never been a case filed.

were not litigants.
interest.

They had resolved

THE COURT:

Did you agree that what he said was

MR. HOOLE:

Your Honor, I do not agree that it

true?
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1

was true, but that suggests that we could go back and

2

relitigate the underlying disputes which, by the parties1

3

settlement, were resolved.

4

settlement agreement.

We simply agreed

5

THE COURT:

Well

6

MR. HOOLE:

—

7

—

—

that the disputes would be kept

confidential.
THE COURT:

8
9

Nobody admitted anything in the

Let me reword my question.

Did you

admit that what he said was in the settlement agreement?
MR. HOOLE:

10

I do not admit that.

No.

He said

11

nothing —

there's nowhere in the settlement agreement

12

where it allows him to make the statements he made.
THE COURT:

13

No, I didn't say anything about

14

allowing him to make them.

I'm saying the statements that

15

he made were true statements from the settlement agreement.

16

MR. HOOLE:

I'm sorry, I don't follow the Court.

17

THE COURT:

Well, the settlement agreement

18

contains certain provisions and he stated those provisions.

19

So what he stated was contained within the settlement

20

agreement?

21

MR. HOOLE:

What he said to the Tribune was

22

outside the settlement agreement, was not permitted by the

23

settlement agreement.

24

THE COURT:

Well, I understand it's permitted

25 1

MR. HOOLE:

I must not be following the Court.

—
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THE COURT:
correctly.

I must not be saying the question

I'm just concerned that the statements which he

made were —

were made from material taken from the

settlement agreement.
MR. HOOLE:

Oh.

I see.

think that they were made —

No, Your Honor, I don't

they were —

I suppose

Mr. Cannon has an opinion, and in fact I think he's
expressed it, and where he got that opinion, I don't know.
It may have been that those opinions may have been
reflected in the settlement agreement to the extent that
that was their defense that they asserted that the parties
resolved.

But the actual allegations in any specificity

are not expressly in the settlement agreement.

I think

they're just referred to.
What the settlement agreement does say is that
all disputes prior to February 9, 1998 between the parties
are resolved and they're not going to talk about them, and
nobody admits any responsibility or liability.

But the

matter's resolved and we're simply not going to talk about
it, other than as narrowly allowed under the
confidentiality clause.
So all disputes, all factual disputes, all legal
claims, all of that, is not properly discussed at this
point.
I hope I answered the Court's question.
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1

THE COURT:

That's fine.

2

MR. HOOLE:

As alleged in our complaint,

3

Ms. Mackey has suffered severe emotional distress and the

4

conduct here was, certainly, wilful and malicious and

5

manifested in knowing disregard toward her rights.

6

therefore, she's entitled to present to the jury a claim

7

for punitive damages.
What we have here, Your Honor —

8
9

And,

this is all

couched in terms of the motion to dismiss, but we have more

10

than a motion to dismiss here.

It's really a factual

11

dispute.

12

definite in stating that —

13

failed to first speak with Mr. Hoole.

14

claims,

Mr. Cannon, in his motion to dismiss, is very
that his only breach is that he
That's what he

I submit that taking the allegations in our

15
16

complaint as true and taking the statement from the

17

transcribed conversation between me and Mr. Harry as true,

18

that Mr. Cannon made a lot more statements, did a lot more

19

to violate that settlement agreement than simply fail to

20

call me first.
There's a factual dispute here, and yet this is

21
22

being presented to the Court in the context of a motion to

23

dismiss.

24

discovery on this case, and we'll get into this, I'm sure,

25

in a minute.

And, Your Honor, we have tried to conduct

But we have been prevented from following
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1

through on our discovery.

We have a factual dispute here

2

between what the Salt Lake Tribune says and what Mr. Cannon

3

says, and we need to have that clarified.

4

the motions that have been filed, not only do we have a

5

factual dispute that we're entitled to have sorted out, but

6

J we have a procedural logjam where they are saying, "Dismiss

But because of

our case before we have to submit to a deposition."
Mr. Cannon's position.
g

10
11
12
13
14

That's

And the Tribune is saying, "We

I don't know yet whether or not we want to claim a privilege,
because we don't understand your complaints.

There's not

enough facts in it; we haven't been able to make an
informed decision.

And we're going to wait and see if the

case is dismissed before we do that."
And that's —

that is what's so difficult here,

15

Your Honor, is that Ms. Mackey has, in good faith, brought

16

this action and has clarified her claims and the facts and

17

is entitled to proceed and, yet, is being obstructed by

18

these efforts.

19

And I submit that we ought to be allowed an

20

opportunity, if the Court is inclined to grant the motion

21

to dismiss, to brief the motion.

22

preserved our claim and our right to do so.

23

the amended complaint moots that motion.

24

the amended complaint, if accepted as true, subject to

25

later discovery and bolstering of those facts for trial,

Because I think we've
But I think

And the facts in
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1

| which is the appropriate procedure.

I submit that, based

2

I on that, the motion should be denied.

3

Thank you.

4

THE COURT:

5

MS. WOOD:

6

Your Honor, if I may approach the bench, I did

7
8
9
10

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

the prior newspaper articles about this case, which I think
the Court can take judicial notice of, and about the
claims.
Your Honor, I think it is important to emphasize
that my comments went totally and completely to the amended
complaint.

24
25

And the motion to dismiss was renewed with

respect to the amended complaint.

I don't know how much

time Mr. Hoole needs to respond to a motion to dismiss, but
I think —

let's see, he filed his complaint in April and

we're now nearly to August —

that that is plenty of time

to respond to a motion to dismiss.

And the plain fact of

the matter is that he's had an adequate opportunity to
brief it and that it is indisputable that he's failed to
state a claim under emotional distress or privacy.
Now, let's talk about the breach of contract

22
23

May I respond briefly, Your Honor?

bring copies for the Court as well as for opposing counsel

11
12

Thank you, Counsel.

claim.

And I think it's important to understand that a

court interprets a contract as a matter of law and that
Mr. Hoole has set forth, on page 3 of his complaint, the
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1

only part of that contract that he's apparently concerned

2

about —

3

and I don f t like the way he keeps misquoting it.

and I think that that language is very critical

"The parties agree that the factual and legal

4
5

allegations relating to their claims and disputes arising

6

prior to the date of this settlement agreement shall be

7

confidential and not be disclosed to third parties."

8

It doesn't say one thing about the parties

9

—

anything other being confidential other than the factual

10

and legal allegations.

11

statements that Mr. Hoole is so offended by in his

12

complaint do not amount to a statement of the factual or

13

legal allegations relating to their claims and disputes.

14

Nowhere —

15

anyone sitting in this courtroom what it was that

16

Ms. Mackey alleged happened, why it was that Mr. Cannon

17

believed it didn't happen, and why there was a defense,

18

nobody would have a clue.

19

factual and legal allegations relating to their claims and

20

disputes, which is the only thing he was prohibited from

21

talking about.

22

about those arising prior to the date of the settlement

23

agreement.

24
25

And I submit, on page 4, the

and if I were to ask the Court this morning or

Mr. Cannon did not discuss the

And he was only prohibited from talking

Now, Mr. Cannon was free to say anything he
wanted to arising after his opinions —

after the date of
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the settlement agreement.
THE COURT:

Through the whole settlement

agreement?
MS. WOOD:

Your Honor, I don't think that he

could disclose the settlement —

the terms of the

settlement agreement, which he did not.

I don't think he

could disclose the factual allegations that gave rise to
their disputes, which he did not.

There is no question,

nowhere on that list is there any of that.
The closest it comes to it is that there was no
hostile environment existing in Mr. Cannon's office.

And,

Your Honor, that was already a matter of public record.
Mr. Cannon's position on that was very clear.

That had

been in the press repeatedly prior to the time of the
settlement agreement.

And it's absolutely ludicrous to say

he couldn't say what he had always said, which is that
there was no hostile environment in his —

in his office,

when that was already a matter of public record.

It could

not, by definition, be confidential.
And you don't know, nobody sitting here knows,
none of the reporters know the factual or legal allegations
that gave rise to the disputes.

That's what he was

prohibited from talking about.
He was also permitted to disclose that he didn't
pay any money.

And that was a very critical point to him.
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Now, Your Honor, I found Roger's argument very

1
2

interesting here, because he said he knew there was going

3

to be a disclosure; he didn't even pay attention to the

4

Deseret News article.

5

him, some aide called him.

That it wasn't Mr. Cannon who called

It's very clear —

6

Mr. Hoole can stand up here

7

now and say, "I would have cautioned Mr. Cannon."

But it's

8

very clear that this was a notice-only requirement, and

9

that he didn't pay any attention to it.

And it appears

10

that, as far as Mr. Hoole's concerned, the only disclosures

11

that matter, or the only pressures that matter are the ones

12

coming from the Tribune.

13

of the agreement says.

14

receives pressure and if asked specifically, can state that

15

his campaign and his entities didn't pay a dime.

16

Honor, that pressure, as Mr. Hoole concedes in his

17

transcript, at page 4, was coming from the Hill.

18
19
20
21
22

But that's not what the language
It says that after Mr. Cannon

And, Your

Mr. Cannon was a member of the Judiciary Committee.

Press

being supported by the Democrats were looking for skeletons
in the closet of Republican members of the Judiciary
Committee.
And Mr. Cannon was, as the transcript points out,

23

feeling pressure and was concerned because the Lexis Nexus

24

wasn't carrying the Deseret News article.

25

circumstances, he was free to make the disclosure.

Under those
There's
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1

nothing in this settlement agreement that says if he's

2

feeling pressure from the Tribune, he can review —

3

disclose the information from the Tribune.

he can

What it says

4 I is, if he's feeling pressure from the press, he can
5

disclose the information.
Mr. Cannon was indisputably, according to

7

8

I Mr. Hoole's own transcript, feeling pressure from the
press, and he chose to make the disclosure that had already

g I been made to the Deseret News, to the Salt Lake Tribune,
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

rather than making it to the Hill newspapers.

There's

nothing, absolutely nothing, in the settlement agreement
that precluded him from doing that.
Now, I am sorry that Ms. Mackey is so offended by
the fact that Mr. Cannon has no intention of holding her to
a confidentiality agreement.
her to it, it is fine.

If other people want to hold

But all they have alleged here is

that Mr. Cannon would be willing to waive that and that
they are not holding him to it.

"They," obviously

Mr. Cannon speaking for himself.
That he would —

that, in his opinion, she's free

to discuss it, but, in his opinion, there would be no

22

benefit for her to talk about it publicly.

23

no impropriety on Mr. Cannon's part.

24

newspapers.

25

on Mr. Cannon's part.

But there was

That's in all of the

Nobody ever alleged there was any impropriety

The core of this settlement agreement is clear on
the face of the language, is that he was not to disclose
the factual and legal allegations relating to the claims
and disputes prior to the date of the settlement agreement.
And that Mr. Cannon, indisputably, never did.
been alleged.

It's never

And for that reason, there can be no

contract claim.
Your Honor, the emotional distress and the
privacy claims here are, on their face, ludicrous.

There's

not a single case that would support an emotional distress
claim in a case like this, or a breach of privacy claim.
This was not private information; this was information that
was already in the public domain.

There is nothing

outrageous about it.
There are lots of Utah case law which we have
cited, Your Honor, in our briefs dealing with far more
egregious situations, people being sexually touched,
propositioned, subjected to all kinds of hostile
environments.
to —

And the court has said it's not sufficient

really outrageous to state emotional distress.
Those claims, we submit, must be dismissed.
THE COURT: Mr. Hoole, do you wish to argue your

motion for enlargement of time or to take a deposition?
MR. HOOLE:

Yes, Your Honor.

Let me just address

the motion for enlargement of time at this point.
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Counsel's raised issues that I think need to be
briefed.

If the Court is inclined to grant their motion to

dismiss in any part, I think that we have a dispute here
regarding what facts and allegations make —
me.

may —

excuse

I think we have a dispute here regarding what the

facts and allegations mean.

It seems to me very clear that

Mr. Cannon made allegations in his statements to the
Tribune.

They were defense statements.

They were

allegations that there was no merit to the claims.

There

were allegations that nothing came home to roost, that
there was nothing improper by his conduct, nothing improper
in the office.
claims.

Those are allegations.

Those are factual

He stated that as an attorney, as an —

within (inaudible).

It was —

there's no —

you know,

you know,

we're playing games with semantics here.
One of the things I think that we'd like to brief
is the fact that we have brought a claim for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

And what

that covenant says, in a nutshell, is that if there is some
area in a contract where the parties are not able to
specifically identify what they mean, then the Court
applies a reasonableness test.

It's a jury question.

And

the benefit of the bargain reached by the parties is
honored.
And I submit, Your Honor, that the benefit of the
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1

bargain here, for my client, was the ability to have these

2

matters resolved and to have no further discussion of it.

3

And these prior newspaper articles, inaccurate as they may

4

be, have nothing to do with the fact that the parties

5

agreed that there would be no further discussion other than

6

Mr. Cannon saying what is allowed under the settlement

7
8
9

agreement —

and that's one statement that, "Neither I nor

my parties paid any money."

That's all he was allowed to

say.
He went far beyond that and I submit that the

10
11

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing gives rise

12

to a cause of action.

13

right.

14

Court —

15

bargained for.

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

It's not a new and independent

It is simply a cause of action that helps the
helps the parties understand what was really
It shows the materiality of the breach in

this case, that being that the reasonable expectation

—

reasonably expected benefits of the settlement agreement
have been violated by this disclosure, this disclosure that
cannot be responded to, other than through this action for
damages.
Thank you.
M S . WOOD:

Your Honor, if I may address the

enlargement of time, we've had a lot of time.

This thing

has been before the Court for a long time and Mr. Hoole has
had plenty of time to respond.
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I also —

we have breached the covenant of good

faith and fair dealing, and I've taught contracts for 22
years, and I've never seen it described in the way that
Mr. Hoole described it.

The breach of a covenant of good

faith and fair dealing under Utah law, and as cited in our
briefs, gives nothing to the parties but a right to have
the covenants of the contract performed.
clear.

And that's very

It's no independent right.
And if Mr. Hoole wanted to brief that, he could

have done that.
MR. HOOLE:

I'd like to brief that, Your Honor,

with the Court's permission.
THE COURT:

It is important to my client,

Now, does this cover your motion to

take the deposition?
MR. HOOLE:

No, Your Honor.

We have not —

have not addressed that yet and I'd be happy to.

I

I'd like

to take just a moment to address that motion, Your Honor.
Soon after filing this action we, of course,
subpoenaed the reporter's notes and the reporter's tape of
Mr. Cannon's conversation.
deposition.

We also noticed Mr. Cannon's

And there's been some reference in the record

that we weren't cordial about how we did that.

And I'd

like to point out that we sent a letter and said, "These
are the dates we understand Mr. Cannon's going to be
available.

This is the date we have picked.

Here is a
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1

notice.

2

please let us know and we'll work something out."

3

didn't get anything but a motion for protective order in

4

response to that that mischaracterized what had happened

5

prior to that time.

6
7

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

If this date does not work for you or Mr. Cannon,
We

We have a factual dispute in this case, and the
factual dispute is between the Tribune, which says, "These
statements were made to us," and they ran an article
incorporating some of them, and Mr. Cannon's statement that
the only breach was his failure to contact me first.
Well, I submit, Your Honor, that that is an
enormous factual dispute and that this is more akin to a
motion for summary judgment, where factual disputes must be
resolved in favor of the non-movant —
Ms. Mackey —

in this case,

than it is a motion to dismiss.

But, in any event, we have pleaded our claims
with sufficient particularity to go forward with discovery
and we're now entitled to depose Mr. Cannon.
at a reasonable time.
inconvenience.

We will do it

We do not mean to cause him any

If the Court were to read my letter to

Counsel, it would be obvious that that was our intention.
Our intention was to work with him and to be as
accommodating as possible.
that deposition.

But they don't want us to take

That's all it boils down to.

And that is

a problem because we are also being faced with a motion for
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1

protective order by the Tribune, which is saying, "We're

2

not going to decide whether we want to even give you this

3

tape until we see how your litigation plays out for a

4

5
6
7

I while.

10
11
12
13
14
15

that, and, by the way, we want you to take Mr. Cannon's
deposition first."
So we're —

18

21
22
23
24
25

we've got a

and there is no reason why we shouldn't be allowed to take
Mr. Cannon's deposition.

We'll do so at a convenient time,

and I don't anticipate that it will be lengthy.
a litigant just like everybody else.

But he is

He's not entitled to

any particular protection or status just because he's a
member of Congress.
But, that being said, we'll certainly work with
his schedule.

We'll do all we can to work with him, as

I've notified Counsel in writing before.
We've briefed this issue.

19
20

like I said, we're —

factual dispute and a procedural logjam here, Your Honor,

16
17

if the motion to

dismiss is granted, we'll see if the Court does this or

8
9

And we'll see if your motion —

entitled to take his deposition.
that we're not.

We think we're

I can't imagine a reason

And it's our motion, so I'll hear what

Counsel has to say and then I may have to respond a little
bit.

Thank you.
MS. WOOD:

Your Honor, we don't believe you're

entitled to take a deposition until you've stated a claim.
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1

We filed our second motion to dismiss the amended complaint

2

on July 10th, 18 days ago.

3

responded to that.

4

entitled to be a litigant and to take a deposition.

5

states a claim under a lawsuit, then, obviously, we're

6

going to cooperate in discovery consistent with

7

Mr. Cannon's schedule, as we have repeatedly said with this

8

Court.

Mr. Hoole has still not

Until he has stated a claim, he's not
If he

But it's been 18 days since we responded to his

9
10

amended complaint, and he has filed no response to the

11

motion to dismiss.

12

opportunity and I don't think he ought to be able to do

13

discovery in the meantime.

Now, I think he has foregone that

Now, this allegation that there's a factual

14
15

dispute here is ridiculous.

16

the motion to dismiss, everything he pled in his complaint,

17

everything that he attached to his complaint, including the

18

transcripts.

19

of this motion concerning anything that was reported in the

20

newspaper article or that Mr. Hoole has alleged in his

21

complaint.

22

establish whether those things were said or not.

23

conceded them for purposes of this motion by virtue of

24

filing a motion to dismiss.

25

We accepted, for purposes of

We have never raised a dispute for purposes

He doesn't have to take a deposition to
We have

And we say they're not sufficient on their face.
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And he has not responded to that in writing, although he
has had more than adequate time under the law.

And there

is simply no reason for him to take a deposition if he
can't state a claim.
MR. HOOLE:

I have nothing further on the motion

to compel Mr. Cannon's deposition.

If the Court would

like, I could address the motion to compel discovery from
the Tribune.
THE COURT:

You may proceed on that.

MR. HOOLE:

This is an interesting motion, Your

Honor, and it raises a number of interesting questions for
the Court.

And, as the Court will remember, I went into

the factual background of my conversation with Mr. Harry
and —

and whatnot, and that applies now to this motion as

well.

And let me just very quickly refresh the Court's

memory.
Mr. Harry called me on April 15th and said,
"Guess what?

Chris Cannon walked in, started to

voluntarily talk about things and just announced all these
things."

I had no response.

I couldn't respond, as I've

already mentioned.
But there was a significant disclosure by
Mr. Cannon to the Tribune, and then I was asked for a
response.

It was like the Tribune, in giving me as much

information as they wanted, to try and entice a response
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out of me.
too much.

I think they suspected I probably couldn't say
But it's significant that they wanted me to

respond and so they hung the carrot out there on a stick to
see if I'd go for it.
They have filed a motion to quash the subpoena
and a motion for a protective order.

And we have tried to

accommodate them by saying, "We will hold some of our
subpoenas, all we want is the tape.

Let us hear the tape

first and then we'll decide whether or not we have to go
further than that."
Now, this tape, Your Honor, is contemporaneous
evidence.

It is what was said.

It's nobody's

recollection, it is not some kind of evidence of what was
said, it is what was said.

It was the actual statements by

Mr. Cannon to the Tribune, to three reporters.
confidential source.

It's not a

He said it on the record for the

purpose of having a story run.

It would be very

interesting to ask Mr. Cannon in his deposition whether he
would take the position that somehow his statements to the
Tribune are privileged in his eyes.
personally assert a privilege?
him that question.

Does Mr. Cannon

I haven't been able to ask

I don't think there is a privilege.

The Tribune has indicated that they want more
discovery done.

They want this motion to dismiss decided.

They want to do a little bit of investigation before they
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decide whether or not they are going to release the tape
voluntarily.

They also claim a privilege.

It's not a

privilege that you'll find in the Utah Rules of Evidence,
it's a privilege that was, according to their argument,
judicially created.
in Branzberg

v.

Hayes,

Following the Supreme Court's decision
at

408 U.S.

665,

a 1972 United

States Supreme Court case.
The issue in that case, Your Honor, I think is
important here.
source and —

In that case there was a confidential

and let me make sure that that's the case.

I'm not certain that that's the case, so let me correct
myself.

But what happened in that case is the reporters

had information that was relevant to a grand jury
proceeding.

And they asserted a claim of privilege.

And

the court said that there is no privilege for a reporter
and said, quote, "There is no reason to hold that these
reporters, any more than any other citizen, should be
excused from furnishing information that may help the grand
jury in arriving at its initial determination," close
quote.

408 U.S.

at

702.

Your Honor, our situation is the same. We have—
we have a voluntary statement made to three reporters in a
meeting, a free-for-all discussion.

It wasn't a

confidential source, it's contemporaneous evidence.

We're

not wishing to burden the Tribune by this, but this
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evidence is central to our case.

It's absolutely critical.

I think it's important to note that there have
been some Circuit Court opinions after the United States
Supreme Court decision which have, in some form, fashioned
a very narrow reporter's privilege.

But in the motion to

quash filed by the Tribune, every one of those cases cited,
with the exception of one Ninth Circuit case, dealt with a
confidential source.
here.

There's no claim of confidentiality

Mr. Harry said that on the tape recording.

I would

assume Mr. Cannon would not try to hide behind the
reporter's privilege after doing what he did.
Your Honor, the Tribune argues that they will be
somehow prejudiced because they're subject to great expense
and burden.

I'll pay for the tape.

That's all I need.

I just need one copy.

This is different from most cases where

they may be burdened by people trying to do discovery
through their efforts.
their efforts.

But this is not discovery through

The action arose in their office and they,

like any other citizen who may have a recording of the
events, need to turn over the tape.
I wrote a letter to counsel for the Tribune, and
I said in that letter —

and that's at page 11 of my

memorandum in opposition to their —
quash.

At page 11, it says:

to their motion to

It is not my intention to

inconvenience the Tribune or its staff.

In fact, it is
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likely that the depositions of the reporters will not be
necessary once I obtain the contemporaneous tape of what
was said.

Accordingly, before proceeding with depositions

on May 19th, 1998, I propose that the Tribune produce a
copy of its tape after receiving the actual contemporaneous
recording, I will very likely cancel the depositions and
not reschedule them, unless Mr. Cannon later disputes his
statements to the Tribune or the context in which they were
made.ff
I just want the evidence.

I'm not trying to

burden the Tribune.
They have talked about this reporter's privilege.
Let's assume for purposes of this argument that a narrow
privilege exists.

That privilege can be overcome.

There's

a balancing test, Your Honor, that's been announced by the
courts.

The balancing test requires a determination of

relevancy, necessary —

necessity, a termination of whether

or not the information sought goes to the heart of the
matter, and whether the information can be found elsewhere.
• With respect to the first prong, relevancy, I
think it's beyond dispute that that tape's relevant.
won't even spend more time on that.

I

It's addressed in my

brief.
With respect to necessity, that's the evidence.
That's what happened.

It's absolutely necessary.

This

—
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1

this issue was addressed by Magistrate Judge Ronald Boyce

2

in the Bottomly

3

Silkwood

4

quote, "There is no indication that defendant's inquiries

5

have been or will be successful in leading to the discovery

6

of admissible evidence.

7

from the deposition of movants is not of central importance

8

or crucial to the case."

case.

And in that case, relying on the

and the Grand Buchette

case, the court stated,

The inquiry and possible evidence

Well, Judge Boyce found that balancing this

9
10

reporter's privilege against the need of discovery that

11

what they wanted to find out through discovery wasn't

12

important, wasn't part of the central case.

13

it is our case.

14

the case more than these tapes —

15

- under Judge Boyce's analysis, clearly, this reporter's

16

privilege is distinguished.

There's nothing that goes to the heart of
than this tape.

And we -

We clearly meet the burden.

Availability from other sources.

17

I submit that

I submit that

18

the papers filed by the defendants in this case have stated

19

matters which, compared to the Tribune's statements, which

20

are also a part of the record in this case, are very huge

21

issues of credibility that need to be ferreted out in

22

discovery.

23

ask Mr. Cannon what was said that I would get a full and

24

complete understanding of that as compared to the tape.

25

just don't think that anything is going to suffice but the

I am not so naive to think that if I were to

I
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tape in this case, and nothing will get this issue resolved
faster than a disclosure of this tape.
The nature of the information is absolutely
critical.

This was not a confidential source.

these cases are about.

That's what

It's not a confidential source.

And even if it was, that claim of privilege was laid, Your
Honor, when Dan Harry called me and said, "This is what
I've just been told."

The Court has the transcript of that

conversation in front of him.

He said, "This is what I've

been told," and goes through all of the things that he can
recall and says, "Well, I'll have to go back and check my
notes, but this is what's happening.

What's your

response?"
He's clearly trying to get me to respond.
are waiving the privilege.

They

And there's a very interesting

case, and I've cited it at page 18 and 19 of my memorandum
in opposition to the motion to quash.
1964.

It's a Utah case,

It deals with the spousal privilege, but it's

instructive here.

And I'd like to just read that quote

because I think it's very important.
It says:

The defendant could either claim the

privilege or waive it, whichever it thought would be b e s t —
would be to its best advantage.
They don't have to assert it, they can claim or
they can waive it.

And if the Court even reads their
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1

filings, they haven't decided whether to claim it or to

2

waive it.

3

outcome today.

4

conversation took place between me and Mr. Harry.

They want more to happen.

They want to see the

But beyond that, it was waived when that

The court goes on in this 1964 case, State

5

v.

6

Brown:

7

waiving the privilege and obtaining the benefit of having

8

the witness testify and still claim some of the protection

9

refusal to testify affords.

But it could not engage in halfway measures by

They can't have it both ways,

10

the court says.

You can't waive it and then claim it.

If

11

the privilege is claimed, it should be scrupulously

12

protected.

13

just as though it did not exist, and the witness is then in

14

the same status and subject to the same treatment as any

15

other witness; no more, no less.

But when it is waived, it is done away with,

Well, Your Honor, I've mentioned that we are in a

16
17

dilemma.

The Tribune says, "Take Cannon's deposition

18

first; let's see how things turn out."

19

"Dismiss my case; don't take my deposition."

20

factual disputes here and, frankly, we need the Court to

21

help us get through this logjam and be able to proceed with

22

this case.

Cannon's saying,
There's

Thank you.

23

MS. SONNENREICH:

24

Counsel has done a masterful job of reasserting

25

that there is no fact —

Thank you, Your Honor.

that there are factual disputes
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1

here.

2

when he attempted to characterize for you what that factual

3

dispute is.

4

between statements made in the Tribune and Mr. Cannon's

5

statement that his only breach was a failure to notify

6
7
8
9

But I think the most telling statement he made was

Mr. Hoole.

Mr. Hoole said that you have a factual dispute

That is not a factual dispute at all.

What

that is is a legal issue that's appropriate to resolve in a
motion to dismiss.
Mr. Cannon does not deny a word of what he said

10

to the Salt Lake Tribune.

11

deny a word of what he said earlier in February in the

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

As I understand it, he doesn't

interview that he gave to the Deseret News.

The issue is:

Did those statements that he does not disclaim making
constitute either one of the cluster of torts that he has
asserted under Utah common law, or a violation of the
settlement agreement?

That is not an issue that requires

any third-party discovery whatsoever.
He is willing to say, "Yes, I said those things."
The issue is how does the common law and how does the law
of contracts under the settlement agreement apply to those?
Let me address very briefly an issue relating to
the language of the confidentiality agreement before I get
into making some rebuttal comments concerning the nature of
the reporter's privilege.
M s . Wood has done a very thorough job in her
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brief in addressing the elements of the various tort
claims.

It seems to me that the real issue will boil down

to whether the statements made to the Tribune and not
disputed constitute a violation of this settlement
agreement.

All of us, as third parties, and you, frankly,

as the court, are at something of a disadvantage because we
can only see one little piece of the settlement agreement.
But the little piece that we do see, there are a couple of
ways to interpret.
The settlement agreement promises that Mr. Cannon
will not, after February 9th, disclose anything other than
permitted by paragraph E.
that:

One way to read this is to say

The parties agree that they will not disclose

confidential information, except that on Monday, February
9th, they're going to make this joint statement that's
quoted and, E, thereafter, if further pressured by the
media and asked specifically whether the Cannon entities
have contributed, they can make these statements.
It doesn't say that that is a series of events
that's anticipated.

It would be perfectly logical to read

that as saying if, at any point, Rep. Cannon gets
pressured, he can talk to Mr. Hoole and, at that point and
thereafter, he is allowed to make the statements outlined
in the settlement agreement.

That is a very logical way to

read it in light of the way media functions in this world.
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Once he has said that to the Deseret News, felt
that he was pressured, disclosed to Mr. Hoole, he was free
to go to the Tribune, to The Hill newspaper, anyone else,
and make the same or similar statements.

I think this

should be read as kind of a trap door; once it happens,
it's happened.

There's nothing in here that requires

Mr. Cannon to go back to Mr. Hoole at each event of
potential disclosure under the agreement.
Therefore, since he does not dispute that in
February he gave —

he was notified of the right to do

this, I think it would be very difficult for the Court to
find this to be a breach of the agreement for him to go
and, in essence, give the same type of interview and make
the same type of statements to the Tribune a few months
later, or to The Hill or anyone else.
There is definitely a reporter's privilege
recognized both by Utah law and by the Federal
constitution.

Rule 501 of the Utah Rules of Evidence

incorporates all constitutional privileges.

There is

obviously a constitutional quasi-privilege for reporters.
Mr. Hoole is absolutely correct, the media lost
the original 1972 court case.

However, in the seeds of

that defeat were the creation of the quasi-privilege, which
has two elements.

First is the element of centrality.

Second is a requirement that all other sources for the
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information be first exhausted.

In that regard, it's kind

of like a work product privilege, where attorneys' work
product, like reporters1 work product may, under some
circumstances, be available but it is not ever the first
line of resort.
I am simply baffled by how Mr. Hoole can make a
distinction between confidential sources and nonconfidential sources.

Let me read you squibs from two

cases that are cited in our briefing.
"This distinction between confidential and nonconfidential information is utterly irrelevant to the
chilling effect that the enforcement of these subpoenas
would have on the flow of information to the press and the
public.

To compel production of a reporter's resource

material is equally as insidious as a compelled disclosure
of confidential informants."
In another case that we cite, and these are on
page 7 of our reply memo:

"The reporter's qualified

privilege applies to all information acquired by the
reporter in gathering news, regardless of whether the
information is confidential, because the purpose of the
privilege is to assure to the fullest extent possible, the
free flow of information to the public."
In light of that case law, it's simply silly to
say that they're —

that the cases make a distinction
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between confidential and non-confidential.

They don't.

The tape recording of Rep. Cannon is one of the Tribunefs
source materials.

It is as privileged as the photographs

of the traffic accident discussed in one of the Tenth
Circuit cases laid out in our briefs.
There are, as I said, two prongs to meeting that
privilege.

The first issue is centrality.

In this case,

were there a factual dispute between what Mr. Cannon says
he said to the Tribune and what the Tribune reported that
he said I would concede that there was centrality to this
issue.

But there is no dispute whatsoever as to what

Mr. Cannon said.

It's just a matter of applying the law to

that.
Mr. Hoole also fails the second prong, which is
the availability of other sources.

The first and prime and

best source of what Mr. Cannon said, should he ever dispute
it, would be Mr. Cannon.

There were also two aides

accompanying him to that interview, neither of whom has any
sort of privilege that they could assert.

Those are the

sources who should be exhausted first, if in fact the
complaint is found to state a cause of action at all.
Those are the people who should be examined before anyone
with a privilege or a quasi-privilege even enters the arena
of discovery.
As to the issue of waiver and the Utah case

State
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1

v. Brown,

2

What happened there is Mr. Brown was alleged to have

3

committed a rape.

4

first trial.

5

At the second trial, the prosecutor examined her as to why

6

she hadn't testified in the first trial, and issues of

7

privilege came up in that context.

8

is a case about credibility.

9

to say to Mrs. Brown on the stand, "Gee, Mrs. Brown, this

Your Honor, I invite you, please read the case.

Mrs. Brown did not take the stand at the

There was an appeal of the rape conviction.

But what it really is

Was the prosecutor entitled

10

is mighty interesting that when your husband was first

11

accused of this crime, you didn't testify about his alibi

12

and today you're here with an alibi.

13

How come?"

The Utah Supreme Court had no difficulty with

14

that at all.

15

although it certainly made some interesting reading.

16

is no such thing as a waiver of the reporter's privilege by

17

talking to the other side in a dispute.

18

But it's just not a case about privilege,
There

Mr. Hoole began his remarks to you today by

19

complaining how totally unfair this was.

20

to the Tribune and made his statements about it, but he

21

couldn't say anything.

22

his argument that, by asking him to say something, the

23

privilege is waived.

24
25

Mr. Cannon went

That seems to completely undercut

All the Tribune did was go to Mr. Hoole and say,
"This is what we're going to print about what Mr. Cannon
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says about your client, and he says that he's willing to
2

I waive confidentiality.

3
4

5

What f s your version of events?"

We would have loved absolutely nothing better
] than to have Mr. Hoole and Ms. Crelley give us a full
interview on the record telling us their version of events.

6

I Instead, they wait until we publish what Mr. Cannon

7

| indisputably said and then try to come in through the back

8
9
10
11

door to attack that reporting, not by giving us their own
version of events, but by asserting that they're entitled
to fish around in the reportage process, even though the
complaint may not state a cause of action.
And I submit that that is wrong in a case dealing

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

with a quasi-privilege and it would be wrong dealing with
any witness, because third-party witnesses of any sort
should not be burdened until a plaintiff has been able to
set forth a cause of action.

And in the case of a quasi-

privilege, until all other evidence going to that cause of
action —

in the event there is in fact a dispute about

that evidence —

has been exhausted.

MR. HOOLE:

Thank you.

I'll be very brief, Your Honor.

I didn't realize Ms. Sonnenreich was Ms. Wood's

22

co-counsel, but they've certainly teamed up together on

23

this to try and deny our discovery.

24
25

It's stated that Mr. Cannon —

at least by

Ms. Sonnenreich, that Mr. Cannon doesn't deny a word he
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said to the Tribune.
say to the Tribune?

The question then is: What did he
That is not covered completely by what

Mr. Harry could remember and told me.
Tribune needs to be known.

What he said to the

The only way to find that out

is by listening to the tape.
Ms. Sonnenreich suggests that we need to exhaust
all other sources. And we have tried to take Mr. Cannon's
deposition and he has filed a motion for protective order.
We're trying to do what we're supposed to do.
Ms. Sonnenreich suggests that there's some lack
of distinction between a confidential source and a nonconfidential source.

I disagree with that.

I think

Mr. Harry made it very clear that this was no confidential
source.

"He was speaking voluntarily on the record, wanted

me to write his story."
Mr. Harry.

That is what was said to

At least that's what Mr. Harry said to me.

It's not a confidential source. We all know the difference
between a confidential source, one that does have some
protection and somebody who just wants their story said.
There is a big difference there.
And, finally, Your Honor, with respect to the
waiver, this privilege, if it exists at all, and the
Supreme Courts says it does not, no higher court has ever
said that it does, if it exists at all, the balancing test
is in our favor.

Moreover the privilege has been waived.
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Read the case State

v.

Brown.

Also read Rule 507 of the

Rules of Evidence, which states —

and I have a copy for

the Court and counsel, if I may approach.
Rule 507, Your Honor, states —

and this is in

the Utah Rules of Evidence, the part that deals with
privileges —

after discussing what privileges are

available in Utah, it says:
confirm —

A person upon whom these rules

confer a privilege against disclosure of the

confidential matter or communication waives the privilege
if a person or a predecessor, while holder of the
privilege, voluntarily discloses or consents to the
disclosure of any significant part of the matter or
communication.
I submit that Mr. Harry disclosed significant
parts of the matter of communication in an effort to try
and get me to comment on what Mr. Cannon had said and,
therefore, waived any privilege that might attach.

Thank

you.
THE COURT:

Counsel, here's the way I look at

this case, and this is my ruling.
First of all, of course, the issue as far as the
complaint's been resolved, and which I think is proper, as
has been stated here and the rules do provide the right to
amend a complaint on one occasion prior to responsive
pleadings being filed.

And so the Court has accepted
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defendant's complaint.

I'm of the opinion the motion to

dismiss then goes to amend the complaint.
I'm also of the opinion that this is probably a
motion that, under the Rule B motion, that they have the
right to bring that motion prior to the discovery being
made, prior to further pleadings in the case. Therefore,
the Court feels compelled to rule on that motion at this
point.

And I'm of the opinion that the —

complaint now —

Where's the

that the motion to dismiss is well taken

as to the third claim for relief, which is defined as
defamation and invasion of privacy.
The fourth cause of action entitled Infliction of
Emotional Distress and the punitive damages claim.

The

Court is denying the motion at this time as to the first
cause of action entitled Breach of Contract, and the second
cause of action, A Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith
and Fair Dealing.

The Court would grant the plaintiff's

motion for enlargement of time to reply to the motion to
dismiss regarding those matters.
also is —

The Court at this time

I was going to say deny, and maybe that's what

I'm doing, maybe it's just suspend —

denying or suspending

the right to take Mr. Cannon's deposition until such time
as this —

the enlargement of time has been complied with

and briefs been filed regarding that.
The Court is also of the opinion that the motion
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1 I to obtain the tapes from the Tribune Corporation is not
2 [ well taken at this time and would deny the motion to obtain
3

that material until after this motion —

until this

4 I enlargement of time has been complied with.
I guess what I'm saying is that I'm granting the

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22 \

23
24
25

12(b) motion as to two or three causes of action.

I'm

giving time to have the matter more fully briefed, as the
other two.

I'm holding in abeyance reading my ruling on

the right to take the deposition of Mr. Cannon and the
right to the discovery from the Tribune Corporation, as far
as the tapes and —

of the interview is concerned.

And

that if the plaintiff is able to survive the enlargement of
time and the 12(b) motion for the other two causes of
action, then, in all probability, the Court is going to

—

no question I'm going to give him further discovery in the
matter, as far as depositions and/or possibly getting into
the tapes.
I would make the order —
the Tribune has indicated this —

and, of course, I think

that they are not to

destroy any tapes or any materials which they have
concerning this matter.
Any questions?
M S . WOOD:

Your Honor, when will Mr. Hoole

respond to our motion to dismiss?
THE COURT:

Mr. Hoole?
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MR. HOOLE:

Your Honor, I -—

I think I can do

that within ten days
THE COURT:
MS. WOOD:

That's fine.
And then we can have —

that's going

l to put us right in the middle of a trial, Your Honor.
Could we have it till after the trial to file a reply
brief?
THE COURT:

I have no problem.

MR. HOOLE:

If I could then have 15 days, since

they're going to be in trial.
THE COURT:

You may have 15 days.

MR. HOOLE:

Thank you.

MS. WOOD:

Okay.

And then we'll work out with

Mr. Hoole when we'll file our reply when we get out of
trial.
THE COURT:

Who's going to prepare the orders?

MR. HOOLE:

I'd be happy to, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Thank you, Mr. Hoole.

MS. WOOD :

Thank you, Your Honor.

(Whereupon, at the hour of 9:44 a.m.,
the hearing was concluded. )
-oooOooo-
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-oooOooo-

THE COURT:

The matter before the Court is the

case of Crelley Mackey v. Chris Cannon.
Are the plaintiffs present and ready to proceed?
MR. HOOLE:

Yes, Your Honor.

Roger Hoole and

Heather Morrison on behalf of the plaintiff.
THE COURT:
MS. WOOD:

Now, the defendant?
Your Honor, Mary Anne Wood and Sheri

Mower on behalf of the defendant.
THE COURT:

This comes before the Court on

defendant's motion to dismiss?
MS. WOOD:

It does, Your Honor.

However, we, if

you recall, argued that motion back in August, and
plaintiff —

the Court dismissed all allegations except for

two, and plaintiff requested the opportunity to —
additional briefing.

for

That's now complete and we don't

think it adds anything.

And I think it would be

appropriate for the plaintiff to tell us why he thinks he's
now stating a claim and then I'd be happy to respond.
MR. HOOLE:

I'll go in either order, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

That's fine.

MR. HOOLE:

Thank you, Your Honor.

As the Court will recall, this matter arises out
of a confidential settlement agreement entered into by my
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client, Mr. Cannon, and other parties in February of 1998
and Mr. Cannon's subsequent voluntary and unilateral action
of going to the Tribune and expressing his opinions and
views regarding the matters which were made moot by the
settlement agreement and which, by the settlement
agreement, the parties agreed there would be no further
comment on by the parties.
We have, in our memorandum beginning at page 2,
laid out our factual allegations from the complaint.

And

because, for purposes of a motion to dismiss, these factual
allegations are deemed to be true, as acknowledged by the
defendants in their papers, I'd like just for a minute to
go through them.

Because I think itfs important to state

the allegations in the complaint to show the Court that the
claims have been properly pleaded and the matter is
appropriately before the Court and the other side should be
required to file their answer to these things, if that has
not already been done.

I don't recall.

But, in any event,

let me start with the facts and go through them very
briefly, as I mentioned.

And this starts at page 2 of our

memorandum.
Paragraph 1 just references the fact that the
settlement agreement was entered into on February 9th of
this year, and that's paragraph 9 of the complaint.
Paragraph 2 on page 2 of our papers indicates
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that the settlement agreement not only resolved and
rendered moot the factual and legal allegations which had
existed between the parties prior to the time of the
settlement, but also did a very important thing, and that
is it, by agreement of the parties, prohibited the parties
from further disclosing any such factual or legal
allegations by language expressly contained in the
settlement agreement.

And that language is found at page 3

of our memorandum and is very important.
And, Your Honor, I intend to address that
language in more detail in my presentation, so I will not
take the time to read that lengthy paragraph to the Court
at this point.
contents.

I'm sure the Court is already aware of its

But I will reference it in more detail later.

That, however, is contained at paragraph 10 of the
complaint.
Paragraph 11 of the complaint indicates that on
April 15th of this year, months after this settlement
agreement had been entered into and months after the media
problems with this case had died down, Mr. Cannon,
apparently concerned about happenings in Washington and his
role on the Judiciary Committee, walked into the Salt Lake
Tribune and met with, apparently, three reporters, obtained
their attention and, for the purpose of having a newspaper
article run, expressed his opinions and his conclusions as
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1

to the factual allegations and the legal disputes that had

2

been in dispute which had been made moot by the settlement

3

agreement and which, by the settlement agreement, were

4

expressly made confidential.

In other words, there were

5

two parts to this agreement.

All of the factual

6

allegations and legal disputes prior to February 9 were

7

rendered moot, they were settled.

8
9

it anymore.

We agreed on that and went through very

10

elaborate provisions in the settlement agreement's

11

confidentiality clause in order to assure that only certain

12

things would be said and only then under certain

13

conditions.

14

And our factual allegations continue.

15

voluntary statements, those statements were opinions, they

16

comprised factual allegations, they comprised legal

17

allegations, and the whole purpose of doing that was to get

18

the article published in the Tribune the next day.

19

I

The second part is that nobody would talk about

Those allegations include —

He made

or those statements

20

by Mr. Cannon include the following.

And I'd like to point

21

out for the Court that Counsel has submitted, with their

22

memorandum, copies of all these newspaper articles.

These

23

are obtained from the internet, as I understand it.

But

24

copies of all of these newspaper articles which had run

25

regarding the parties' dispute before the settlement took
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1

place.
And it was the back —

2

this is the media backdrop

3

in which this case arose, and this is the reason, Your

4

Honor, why the confidentiality provision was so important

5

to my client and other parties to this settlement

6

agreement.
In any event, against this media backdrop and

7
8

despite the fact that the parties had mooted their factual

9

and legal disputes, settled them and agreed that they would

10

not talk about this case further, despite all of those

11

things, and knowing that my client was bound by a

12

confidentiality agreement which is plain on its face, and

13

knowing that he was bound by the confidentiality agreement,

14

Mr. Cannon made a number of statements to the Tribune, only

15

some of which we know.

16

on page 4.

17

responded to by my client, given the confidential nature of

18

19

And those statements are summarized

And they're important because they could not be

this settlement.
They are that my client, Crelley Mackey, has the

20

ability to waive confidentiality.

21

is a bold-faced misrepresentation.

22

waive confidentiality.

23

parties to this settlement agreement.

24

Second

25

THE COURT:

That is not true.

That

She has no ability to

She and Mr. Cannon are not the only

—
Who are all the parties to it?
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MR. HOOLE:

There are a number of parties, Your

Honor, of the settlement agreement, including Mr. Warren,
Mr. Cannon's former chief of staff, against who certain
allegations had previously been made; a number of
Mr. Cannon's business entities were also parties; his
political campaign, which is an entity, was a party; the
Congressional Office of Chris Cannon, which is his office
in Washington, D.C.

A separate entity was also a party.

There were a number of attorneys involved in this
settlement and probably a dozen or so parties.
THE COURT:

Did they sign on the confidentiality

agreement?
MR. HOOLE: All of them signed.

And Mr. Cannon

would like this to be viewed as if he can unilaterally tell
the public that Ms. Mackey can waive confidentiality.
simply can't do that.

The confidentiality provision was

the cornerstone of this settlement.
happened without that.
that.

She

It would not have

It would not have happened without

It was extremely important to the parties, and

that's why it's so lengthy and so detailed.
So against this media backdrop and the parties'
agreement not to talk further and Ms. Mackey's inability to
speak further in response to Mr. Cannon's allegations, he
says that she has the ability to waive confidentiality.

He

says that they are not holding her to confidentiality
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! | misrepresentations.
2

He says that although she is free to

j discuss it, there would be no benefit for her to talk about

3

it publicly, leaving a horrendous burden on her and many

4

implications which involve those factual allegations and

5

those legal disputes which were settled which she can no

6

longer respond to.

He does this, to her injury.

He says that there was no impropriety on his
part.
9

10
11
12
13
14
15

He says that there was no hostile environment in his

| office; that there was nothing to her allegations; that
M s . Mackey's allegations had no merit and that they
wouldn't have held up —

he's speaking as a congressman,

he's speaking as an attorney, he's speaking as a party to
this case in a media situation that —

that —

that follows

every one of his words, and he puts M s . Mackey in a very,
very difficult situation where she cannot respond to these
inappropriate comments.

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

So that's what happened on April 15th.
day, the Tribune ran an article.

The next

And Counsel suggests that

because all of this stuff had been in the paper before,
that even though we had a confidentiality agreement in the
settlement agreement, it doesn't matter and he is free to
say virtually everything he wants, virtually anything he
wants is, I believe, the quote from Counsel.

And I can

—

I can tell you, Your Honor, that these articles contain
inflammatory things and M s . Mackey, against this media
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backdrop, had entered into a settlement agreement in good
faith, as did other parties.
honored that, not at all.

And Mr. Cannon has simply not

Ms. Mackey has had no remedy but

to bring an action in order to address that.

That's all

she can do under the terms of the agreement.
I have now covered the essential facts which give
rise to our two pending claims, which are breach of
contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing.
The next thing I want to address, Your Honor, is
the issue of materiality.

Mr. Cannon submits that this was

not material, that this stuff was already out there, that
it had been published months earlier.

I submit that it was

material because we had bargained that nobody would talk
about it again.
At paragraph 20 of the complaint, we state in
summary fashion the allegation that Mr. Cannon,
individually and/or acting on behalf of the employing
office, the campaign, and the Cannon entities, materially
breached the settlement agreement by disclosing
confidential information and expressing opinions regarding
the same.

That states a claim, in light of the other

factual allegations in the complaint.

That states a claim

for breach of contract.
It is responded to by Counsel in their papers
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1

that they've already filed with the court that the only

2

thing that they didn't do, the only fault they could have

3

laid at their feet is that Mr. Cannon himself, or through

4

one of his attorneys, didn't call me before going to the

5

Tribune to tell me he was going to the Tribune.
Now, that's very interesting, and I'd like to

6
7

explore that with the Court, because that whole thing is a

8

red herring, Your Honor.

9

clear, because at this point, I want to talk about the

And I think it will become very

10

actual language of the settlement agreement that is the

11

confidentiality provision in the settlement agreement.
There are, essentially, five parts of the

12
13

confidentiality provision.

The first one is the general

14

statement.

15

page 5 of my material, but Your Honor may wish to refer to

16

page 3, where the entire language is set forth.

17

begin at the top, reading that provision.

18

this was expressly agreed to by the parties.

I'd like to read that.

That is broken down on

And

I'll

It says —

and

It says:

What comments can be made and under what

19
20

circumstances?

21

disputes and factual differences, legal disputes, can be

22

addressed.

23

Any comments regarding the parties' past

It says:

The parties agree that the factual and

24

legal allegations relating to their claims and disputes

25

arising prior to the date of this agreement —

and that was
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February 9th —

shall be confidential and that they shall

not disclose to any third party that confidential
information.

The terms of settlement or the amount of the

payments made under the settlement agreement except, A, to
their attorneys, therapists, tax advisers or their
ecclesiastical leaders, or as required by law.
Your Honor, the defense, as I understand it, is
arguing that that means anything they want to talk about
after February 9th is okay.
case.

Well, that's not at all the

We agreed that the matter would be resolved, it f s

made moot, and nobody would talk further, other than as set
forth in the confidentiality agreement.
Not only was the matter settled, but the parties
expressly agreed that the factual and legal allegations
relating to the claims and disputes between them were
confidentiality and that the parties would not discuss or
disclose those issues or their opinions regarding those
issues to any third party.

It's clearly what the first

part of the settlement agreement says, "except to their
attorneys, therapists, tax advisors, or their
ecclesiastical leaders, or as required by law."
Now, I've mentioned the media backdrop, and it
was enormous.

We knew, Your Honor, we knew that there

would be media pressure to try and find out what the
settlement was all about.

And so we, over a matter of
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1

weeks, negotiated this settlement agreement and the

2

confidentiality clause in order to deal with the problem of

3

what happens if the media contacts somebody and wants a

4

statement.
So the confidentiality clause goes on, and it

5
6

i says that, basically, there is an agreed-upon sentence, one

7

sentence that the parties can say on February 9 of this

8

year, which we will release to the media, which will

g

resolve this issue.

"Ms. Mackey's claims have been resolved to the

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

parties1 satisfaction."

21
22
23
24
25

And pursuant to the settlement

agreement, I released that statement to the media.
"Ms. Mackey's claims have been resolved to the parties1
satisfaction."

That's what was expressly agreed to.

And

that was the one sentence that, apparently, appeared in a
Deseret News article later on in addition to, I think, in
the Tribune.

That is very important.

That's all that we

agreed would be released.
We anticipated that there still may be some

19
20

And it says, in quotes:

pressure, and we had a provision built into the settlement
agreement which dealt with that contingency.

And we agreed

that if there was further media pressure, and after being
asked about that, we would —
I'll —

we would agree to say —

this is also language in the —

and

in the

confidentiality provision, and I'll read it.
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It says:

"Thereafter, if further pressured by

the media and asked specifically whether the Cannon
entities or individuals contributed money to the
settlement, Mr. Cannon or his representatives may respond,
having spoken with Roger H. Hoole, that no Cannon entities
or campaign contributed to any settlement.11
"That no Cannon entities or campaign contributed
to any settlement."

And, Your Honor, that happened.

I was

called and an article, as I've referenced, was run in the
Deseret News where that was said.
the settlement agreement.
We had —

So we're on track with

There's no problem with that.

we had one more provision, and it was

important to the parties that this matter be laid to rest.
And the last provision in the settlement agreement states
as follows:

"Other than as specifically allowed herein,

the parties and their attorneys shall not volunteer any
confidential information, and in response to any request
for information by any person or entity shall only
excuse me —

—

shall say only 'No comment.'"

So we've gone through these various stages to
deal with the media, ending at a point where the parties
agree that the only thing that they will say, after having
stated what was agreed upon expressly by the parties, the
only thing that they will say is "No comment."
where we were, Your Honor.

And that's

We were at the "no comment"
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stage when Mr. Cannon went in to the Tribune,

Never

notified me.

I didn't

I was completely unaware of it.

find out about it until I got called by the Tribune for a
comment, which I couldn't give.

I couldn't respond to

these allegations.
It is significant to the specific language which
the parties agreed to as set forth and was agreed to by
everybody.

This is very troubling, Your Honor, that

Mr. Cannon would accept the benefit of this settlement
agreement, agree to it, sign off, follow the steps and
then, when it was politically expedient for him, vitiate
the entire thing and the entire purpose of the settlement
agreement, leaving my client seriously damaged.
The language is clear.

And if I have somehow not

made myself clear about that, I would encourage the Court
to again look at that entire settlement agreement,
particularly paragraph 6, which is the confidentiality
clause, and see what was allowed under what circumstances
and what was not allowed.
• Mr. Cannon made his comments that Ms. Mackey had
the ability to waive confidentiality, that they were not
holding her to confidentiality, that although she is free
to discuss it, she probably won't in the public, that there
was no impropriety on his part, et cetera, et cetera.
Those are material breaches of this settlement agreement.

They were made —

these comments were made against this

2 I backdrop of media and speculation and had been met with
3
4

only silence by Ms. Mackey.
As I understand the position of the defense, it

5

is that, because this had already been out there,

6

Mr. Cannon was not bound by the confidentiality

agreement

and he was free to express his opinions and that he could
say virtually anything.
Q I
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

They also claim that their only —
default was in not talking with me first.
accurate statements.

their only

Those are not

And if they are presented to this

Court, I would suggest that the Court take a hard look at
that, because that is not at all what this settlement
agreement says.
Your Honor

—

THE COURT:

Did they talk to you first?

MR. HOOLE:

Excuse me?

THE COURT:

Did they talk to you first?

MR. HOOLE:

No.

No.

They called me one time, as

I recall, before the Deseret News article ran.
no problem with the Deseret News article.
in compliance with the —

And I have

It appears to be

that is the quoted portion of

23

Mr. Cannon's representative.

The part they quoted and

24

attributed to him is in compliance, as near as I can tell,

25

with the settlement agreement.

But that was months
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earlier.

When they walked in to the Tribune, they didnft

contact me, and that was at the "no comment" stage.
would be no purpose to contact me.

There

We'd gone through all

the other steps, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

Now, you're confusing me.

As I read

the material, I got the impression they had never contacted
you.

Now you're telling me they contacted you prior to the

Deseret News article.

Was this prior to the articles being

written by the Tribune and Mr. Taggert going in the office?
MR. HOOLE:

Yes. Much, much earlier.

THE COURT:

But it was after the settlement

agreement was signed, the confidential agreement was signed
but prior to the Tribune article?
MR. HOOLE:
signed February 9th.

Yes.

The settlement agreement was

The Tribune ran an article the next

day, and the Deseret News article was February 11th.

So it

was months before Mr. Cannon unilaterally walked in to the
Tribune.
You know, I'm not that concerned by the fact that
he didn't call me.

But he couldn't have said what he said

even if he had called me.

That's a red herring, Your

Honor, I believe, and they've tried to make that the issue.
But the fact is, he couldn't say what he said.
agreed to be silent on the issue.

He had

That's the point. And

we were at the "no comment" stage.
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Now, we've already discussed this in some detail

1
2

previously, and we had a disagreement whether or not

3

that is, Counsel had a disagreement whether or not Utah

4

recognizes the implied covenant of good faith and fair

5

dealing.

6

brief that, and I set forth the authority —

7

authority in Utah which clearly states that is recognized

8

in every contract.

And it also —

—

and then the Court allowed me to
some of the

9

But what is the implied covenant of good faith

10

and fair dealing and are we trying to use that to create

11

new independent rights and claims?

12

covenant of good faith and fair dealing is very simple.

13

says that if there is a dispute over what a contract means,

14

the court is able to look at what the purpose of the

15

contract was and determine whether or not the parties have

16

acted in furtherance of the purpose of the contract.

17

other words, each party to a contract has an implied

18

obligation to perform the contract in such a way that the

19

other side gets the fruits and the benefits of the

20

contract.

Well, the implied
It

In

I submit that the contract, on its face, can

21
22

easily —

on its face means that M s . Mackey can reasonably

23

expect that Mr. Cannon won't say anything not expressly

24

permitted by the settlement agreement.

25

entered into the contract for; that was her expected

That was what she
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1

benefit; that was the bargain she reached.

2

And I bring up the implied covenant of good faith

3

and fair dealing because the defense seems to not

4

understand that.

5

confidentiality provision had no bearing on what Mr. Cannon

6

said after the settlement agreement.

7

contrary to common sense, it's contrary to the language of

8

the settlement agreement itself, it's contrary to the

9

12
13
14

The purpose of the settlement was to allow the
parties to put this matter behind them so that no more
churning of the media would occur.

17
18

the contract.

21
22
23
24
25

That has been vitiated.

The implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing clearly exists in Utah.
contract.

It applies in every

It is an obligation that is imposed by law.

cannot be waived.

It cannot be disclaimed.

It

It is there.

We submit that, by acting the way he did and by

19
20

That was the purpose.

Ms. Mackey was entitled to the reasonable expectations of

15
16

And it's simply

purpose of the entire settlement.

10
11

They would like to say that

claiming that he is virtually —

that he is free to say

virtually anything he wants, he not only breaches the
contract, but he breaches the implied covenant within that
contract.

And we are not asking the Court to give

Ms. Mackey additional claims or other causes of action
which —

which are in addition to the claims that she's
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otherwise entitled to.

In other words, Ms. Mackey is not

saying, ffI canft make out a contract claim, so give me the
implied covenant."
contract claim.

Ms. Mackey is saying, "I've got a

I've stated it clearly.

It's pleaded

well, but Mr. Cannon suggests that he doesn't think the
purpose of the settlement agreement was to obtain the
parties' confidentiality agreement."

And because of that

misunderstanding, Ms. Mackey has the right to bring the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to have the
Court focus on what the purposes of the contract were.
What was the purpose of that agreement?
Her claim is that Mr. Cannon has violated his
obligation of good faith and fair dealing in performing the
contract.

She's not asking this Court to invent new

claims, as suggested by the defense.

She is asking the

Court to enforce the agreement and give her the benefit of
the contract she entered into.
Now, Mr. Cannon not only believes, apparently,
that he can say almost anything he wants, he has
demonstrated that belief by acting on it.

And he has, in a

way, reserved to himself, wrongfully, this ability to go
out and talk to anybody about this, the media or whoever he
wants.

By doing that, under Utah law, he has, rightfully

or wrongfully, retained discretion in the performance and—
in how he performs his obligations under the implied
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covenant.

And under Utah law, that puts a higher duty on

him, a heightened duty on him to perform the contract in a
way which does not deprive the other side of the benefits
of the bargain.

And, in that sense, the implied covenant

of good faith and fair dealing really explains what's gone
on in this case.

This cause of action really focuses on —

on the problem and highlights it.
Ms. Mackey's reasonable expectation was that all
of the parties would abide by the settlement agreement and
She f s entitled to that.

its non-confidentiality clause.

That confidentiality clause was the reason we entered into
the settlement agreement.

That's the cornerstone of it.

It would not have happened without the confidentiality
clause.

It simply would not have been a settled case.
The Court is well aware of the public policy in

favor of settling disputes, resolving differences.
that's what we did.

And

And when that involves a

confidentiality provision as detailed and as carefully
prepared as this one, it is —
they are —

when a party breaches that,

they need to answer for it.

Your Honor, in summary, let me just say, we've
got two causes of action left: breach of contract and the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
complaint is pleaded properly.

The

The allegations in the

complaint are deemed to be true.

The allegations in the
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complaint support the causes of action stated in the
complaint.

And Ms. Mackey is entitled to proceed on this

case, on these two causes of action, because there have
been material breaches of both the contract and there have
been violations of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing.

And I would submit it respectfully.

Thank

you.
THE COURT:
MS. WOOD:

Thank you, Counsel.
Your Honor, we've just spent a half an

hour listening to Mr. Hoole's exposition of what he thinks
the purpose of the settlement agreement was, none of which
is in his complaint.

The single question before the Court

today is whether Mr. Hoole has stated a complaint upon
which relief can be granted.

His complaint does not allege

what the express purpose of the settlement agreement was
and that the confidentiality agreement was negotiated for
weeks.

All of that is wrong.

This confidentiality

agreement was an afterthought, as they always are, and took
very little time of the parties.
The confidentiality agreement is not before the
Court and has substantial other details to it. And this
Court simply can't decide this case on the basis of
Mr. Hoole's testimony that his client wouldn't have signed
this agreement but for the confidentiality agreement.

That

is the problem with not having the contract before the Court.
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Another problem with not having the contract
before the Court is that Mr. Cannon never signed this
settlement agreement.
agreement.

He never signed the confidentiality

He is a beneficiary of this settlement

agreement, but he never signed it.

Nevertheless, he has

never violated the terms of the confidentiality agreement,
and Mr. Hoole has not stated a cause of action that he has.
At the bottom line, this case is all about the
fact that Crelley Mackey didn't get any money out of Chris
Cannon the first time around, and now she's looking for any
excuse she can to try to get some more money out of Chris
Cannon and that she is unhappy by the fact that the
contract permitted Mr. Cannon to tell the press that he
didn't pay any money to Ms. Mackey.
line on this lawsuit.

And that's the bottom

So let's back up to the allegations

of the lawsuit and what the settlement agreement says with
respect to confidentiality and see if it states a claim
upon which relief can be granted.
Now, Mr. Hoole is entitled, at the motion to
dismiss stage, to the Court accepting as true the well-pled
factual allegations of his complaint.

He's not entitled to

the Court accepting as true everything he's said for the
last half hour, nor is he entitled to the truth of the
legal allegations he's made.

All he is entitled to is the

truth of the factual allegations he's made.

And we submit
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that Your Honor can look at the terms of the
confidentiality agreement that are in the complaint and the
allegations, the factual allegations, of the so-called
breach and see that it didn't happen, even if Mr. Cannon
had signed the confidentiality agreement.
This is what the confidentiality agreement says,
and all that it says:

"The parties agree that the factual

and legal allegations relating to their claims and disputes
arising prior to the date of this settlement agreement
shall be confidential and that they shall not disclose to
any third party that confidential information.11
definition.

That is a

The parties are defining confidential

information limited to the factual and legal allegations
relating to their claims and disputes.
And I submit, Your Honor, it is so clear that
that has not been breached, because Your Honor sits here in
complete ignorance of what the factual and legal
allegations were that gave rise to this settlement
agreement.

You have no idea what it was that Ms. Mackey

alleged happened, you have no idea of what it was
Mr. Cannon alleged or happened, or their legal theories.
That is not in the Tribune article, that is nowhere set
forth in the complaint that has been filed here, and the
information which is defined as confidential in this
complaint is still confidential.

Nobody has a clue.
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Mr. Hoole has conceded this morning —
didn't concede at our last argument —

which he

that we did comply

with the settlement agreement with respect to notifying him
before we told the media that Mr. Cannon or his entities
did not pay any money.
put to rest.

So that part of the complaint is

So the question is simply limited to whether

any of the allegations of the complaint constitute a breach
of the obligation not to disclose factual and legal
allegations.
Now, Mr. Hoole wants to stand up here and say
that means Mr. Cannon was never entitled to give his
opinion on anything after this dispute was settled.
not what the agreement says.

That's

And confidentiality

agreements, because they are restraints on speech, have to
be strictly construed and particularly in the context of a
congressman who is protected by the speech and debate
clause of the Constitution.

And Mr. Cannon's comments were

prompted by the media hysteria surrounding the fact that he
was on the Judiciary Committee, Clinton was coming before
the Judiciary Committee as a possible grounds —

for

possible impeachment, and the media hysteria knew that
there had been allegations of sexual harassment made
against Mr. Cannon's office, because of all of the articles
which we have already attached to Your Honor —

to the

responses here and that Your Honor has seen.
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The limitation on the parties to this agreement

1
2

was not to talk about the factual legal allegations

3

relating to their claims and disputes arising prior to the

4

date of this settlement.

5

the complaint allege?

Now, did that happen?

What does

Well, the complaint alleges that Mr. Cannon said

6
7

a number of particular things.

It says that Crelley Mackey

8

has the ability to waive confidentiality.

9

that keeps Mr. Cannon from expressing his opinion on that

There's nothing

10

fact.

He may be right on that; he may be wrong on that,

11

but the plain fact of the matter is that is not a factual

12

and legal allegation relating to claims and disputes

13

arising prior to the date of this settlement.

14

anything, it's the dispute arising after the date of the

15

settlement with respect to the interpretation of the

16

settlement agreement.

17

this confidentiality agreement.

If it's

But that is not an express breach of

18

That they are not holding her to confidentiality.

19

Once again, that is Mr. Cannon's opinion, and he is free to

20

express his opinion.

21

agreement that does anything but keep him from talking

22

about the factual and legal allegations relating to the

23

claims and disputes arising prior to the date of the

24

agreement.

25

There is nothing in the settlement

That although she is free to discuss it, there
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would be no benefit for her to talk about it publicly.
2

3

I Once again, that reflects his opinion regarding matters
arising after the date of the settlement agreement.

4

That there was no impropriety on Mr. Cannon's
part.

That was never part of the factual and legal

6

I allegations relating to the claims and defenses of the

7

| parties.

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

The one reason why we've put all those newspaper

articles in there is because M s . Mackey herself says in
those articles there were no claims of impropriety against
Mr. Cannon.

So that was not one of the claims or defenses

of the parties or their factual disputes.

Everybody agreed

on that, and that can't be confidential information.
That no hostile environment existed in
Mr. Cannon's office.

Once again, this is M r . Cannon's

opinion and, furthermore, once again, that is something
M s . Mackey said before this —

before the —

not this

lawsuit but the earlier dispute was even made.

She said it

was a little minor something between two consenting adults.
So that is not part of the factual and legal allegations
relating to the disputes of the parties.
That there was never anything to M s . Mackey's
allegations.

Once again, that's M r . Cannon's opinion and

it doesn't reveal what was expressly defined as
confidential information in this agreement, which is the
legal or factual allegations relating to their claims and
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disputes.
That Ms. Mackey's allegations had no merit.
Again, Mr. Cannon is not disclosing the factual
allegations —

factual and legal allegations relating to

the claims and disputes.

He is simply expressing his

opinions.
That her allegations would not have held up.
Once again, this is simply an expression of his opinion
after the settlement and, again, it doesn't reveal the
legal or factual allegations relating to the claims and the
disputes.
Now, frankly, I don't know why Ms. Mackey wants
to bring this lawsuit, because, if this lawsuit proceeds,
then we're going to have to talk about what the factual and
legal allegations relating to the claims and disputes were.
And, frankly, they're not very pretty.

That's my opinion.

But Your Honor doesn't know them, the press doesn't know
them, the public doesn't know them, because Mr. Cannon did
not breach the express terms of the confidentiality
agreement.

And restraints on speech, confidentiality

agreements are always interpreted narrowly.
If Mr. Hoole, if it really had been Mr. Hoole's
intention, if it really had been critical, if, as he said
this morning, the centerpiece of this settlement was that
nobody would ever, ever express an opinion about it again,
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1

that's not what he got in the terms of this settlement

2

agreement.

3

that the factual and legal allegations relating to people's

He got a very narrow confidentiality agreement,

4 J claims and defenses would be kept confidential.

And they

have been confidential,

5
6 I

And by looking at the terms of the complaint and

7

his allegations of how it was breached, this Court can

8

determine as a matter of law that it hasn't been breached,

9

because there is nothing that he alleges that constitutes

10
11
12

confidential information as defined by the settlement
agreement, which is the factual and legal allegations
relating to the claims and disputes.
Now, Mr. Hoole seems to be arguing —

13
14
15

and we

attached his letter to Mr. Cannon before Mr. Cannon had his
town meeting on Pres. Clinton's impeachment.
be alleging that Mr. Cannon has to call —

He seems to

has to call him

ID
17

| every time he's going to open his mouth.

And that simply

18

is not what is required under the terms of this settlement

19

agreement.

20

Moreover, he seems to be alleging that once

21

something is public knowledge, it is still subject to the

22

confidentiality agreement.

23

was designed to protect certain limited confidential

24

information, the factual and legal allegations relating to

25

the parties claims and disputes.

By definition, this agreement

If that information is
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1

not in the public domain and someone puts it in the public

2

domain then, obviously, there's a breach.

3

already out there somehow, then it's not, by definition,

4

confidential information.

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

But if it's

And Mr. Cannon, in his role as a

congressman, can't be restrained under First Amendment,
under the speech and the debate clause, by a broad
interpretation of a confidentiality agreement that he
didn't even sign but he has abided by.
Now, you know, Mr. Hoole has made all kinds of
strawman arguments here.

We never asserted that Utah

doesn't acknowledge the covenant of —
of good faith and fair dealing.

the implied covenant

I've taught contracts for

22 years in this state, and we would never make the
assertion that the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing is not part of the common law of the state of Utah.
What we did say is that it doesn't broaden
express contract rights, which is what Mr. Hoole has argued
for here today.

He's saying we can take this language,

this language that says that the parties will keep factual
and legal allegations related to their claims and disputes
arising prior to the date of the settlement agreement
confidential and that we can expand that and say that that
means that Mr. Cannon can never give his opinion, or that
he cannot give his opinion about things that arise after,
or that he has to call Roger Hoole every time he wants to
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1

hold a town meeting on whether Pres. Clinton can be

2

impeached, simply because that also happens to involve

3

allegations of sexual harassment.

4

Now, Ms. Mackey got the consideration she

5

bargained for.

5

what the factual and legal allegations relating to the

7

parties' claims and disputes were.

8
9

10
11
12

I been made public.

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

And there is nothing in this narrow

confidentiality agreement that restrains Mr. Cannon's
ability to give his opinion after the fact and to comment
on things.

And if it were, it would be unconstitutional.

Your Honor, we submit that this case has to be
dismissed because there is —
THE COURT:

15
16

Your Honor, I know,

sits there in complete ignorance because those have never

13
14

Nobody in this room has any idea what t h e —

a minute.

has been no claim stated.

Counsel, let's look at this agreement

I've read it and I've read it and I've read it

and I've heard you read it.
MS. WOOD:
THE COURT:

Uh-huh.
"The parties agree that the factual

and legal allegations relating to their claims or disputes
arising prior to the date of this settlement agreement
shall be confidential."
MS. WOOD:

THE COURT:

Yeah.

Now, t h a t ' s what y o u ' r e saying and

t h a t ' s what I read t h a t t h a t says t h a t anything t h a t took
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place, as far as the underlying facts and situation cannot
2

be disclosed.

3

MS. WOOD:

4

THE COURT:

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

And they shall not disclose to any

third party that confidential information.

5
6

Right.

J

MS. WOOD:
THE COURT:

Right.
Now, it goes on.

"The terms of the

settlement or the amount of the payment made under the
settlement agreement, except..."

Now, it says there, as I

interpret that, they cannot disclose any terms of the
settlement agreement except as follows.
MS. WOOD:
THE COURT:

Right.

That's the way I read it too.

And then, of course, it says their

attorneys, their tax, so forth.
MS. WOOD:
THE COURT:

Uh-huh.
Then it says "Disclose on Monday,

February 9th that Ms. Mackey's claims have been resolved to
the parties' satisfaction."
MS. WOOD:
THE COURT:

That can be stated.

Uh-huh.
"Thereafter, if pressured by the

media, after first speaking with Roger Hoole..."
MS. WOOD:
THE COURT:

And that happened.
"...that Ms. Mackey's claims have

been resolved upon satisfaction by settlement, without any
admission of liability or payment of money to Chris
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Mackey —

Chris Cannon or the use of tax dollars."

course, that's all —
MS. WOOD:
THE COURT:

And, of

I guess was done.
Uh-huh.
Then it goes on.

"Thereafter, if

further pressured by the media and asked specifically
whether the Cannon entities have contributed money to the
settlement, Mr. Cannon may respond, after speaking with
Roger Hoole, that no entities or campaign contributed to
any settlement, other than as specifically allowed herein."
Now, my question to you is:

Is that second

sentence, "the term of the settlement or the amount of the
payment except as," broad enough to prevent him from
disclosing or discussing or talking about the settlement
agreement?
MS. WOOD:

Your Honor, I don't think —

it's

obvious that it couldn't keep him from saying there was a
settlement agreement, because that was public.

And he has

not disclosed any of the terms of the settlement agreement.
The only terms of the settlement agreement that are before
Your Honor are the provisions of the confidentiality
agreement.
Your Honor is completely ignorant of the terms of
the settlement agreement.

And he hasn't talked about the

terms of the settlement agreement.
opinions.

He has talked about his

I think it is very important, Your Honor, to
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1

keep reading, because it says, "Other than as specifically

2

allowed herein, the parties and their attorneys shall not

3

volunteer any confidential information."

4

to the definition of confidential information.

5

confidential information is the factual and legal

6

allegations relating to the claims and disputes.

It takes it back
And

That's

what the confidential information was supposed to be.
And, I agree, they were not supposed to disclose
9

10
11

I the terms of the settlement agreement, other than
permitting them to say that there would be no —

were no payments made by Mr. Cannon and his entities.
THE COURT:

12
13
14
15
16
17
18

But did Mr. Cannon discuss the terms

of the settlement agreement as far as discussing the
settlement agreement itself?
MS. WOOD:
complaint.

Your Honor, that is not alleged in the

It is not alleged in the complaint that he

revealed the terms of the settlement agreement.

complaint.

20

allegations in the complaint.

And I walked through every one of the

21

THE COURT:

22

MS. WOOD:

24
25

And we

have to deal with what's in the allegations of the

19

23

that there

Okay.
He expressed his opinions.

wouldn't hold her to confidentiality.
THE COURT:

He said he

And he won't.

Does the settlement agreement —

is

the confidentiality agreement broad enough to limit him in
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1

expressing his opinion on the settlement agreement?
MS. WOOD:

2

No.

It doesn't say that, Your Honor,

3

and that's where I —

4

confidentiality agreements, restraints on speech,

5

particularly when you're dealing with a congressman who's

6

subject to the speech and debate clause, have to be

7

construed narrowly.
And there is nothing here that prohibits him from

8
9

that's where I say that

expressing his opinion about the settlement agreement or

10

anything that happened arising after —

I mean, other than

11

the —

12

know, this is nothing more than just another calculated

13

attempt to try to hit Mr. Cannon up and embarrass him

14

because he's a congressman and because he didn't pay her

15

any money.

arising after the date of the settlement.

And, you

16

We submit it, Your Honor.

17

THE COURT:

Thanks, Counsel.

18

MR. HOOLE:

Your Honor, I can assure you that

19

this is not something that was created by Ms. Mackey.

20

matter had been placed to rest and had not been discussed

21

or in the media for many months.

22

to the press, this was absolutely what she did not want.

23

She did not want this to come up again, and it has come up

24

again, in violation of the agreement•

25

THE COURT:

This

Before Mr. Cannon went in

Now, Counsel, let me ask you about
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that.

I know you have the right to contract and to bargain

for what you want.

But what has Mr. Cannon said that

discloses anything of damage to the plaintiff in this case?

MR. HOOLE:

Well

—

THE COURT:

And —

wait a minute.

Wait a minute.

And I know, if it says in the confidentiality agreement you
can't talk about it at all, that that is a contract of
that.

But does it go that broad and has he said anything

that actually results in damage to her
MR. HOOLE:

Oh, he

THE COURT:

—

—

—

other than what has —

that is

already known?
MR. HOOLE:

Well, Your Honor, I don't know what

else he said to the Tribune, because the Tribune has filed
a motion to ask the Court to quash my subpoena for a copy
of the tape recording of this interview.
what else was said.

So I don't know

We have listed what we know was said.

And I just must explain that these are covered by the
settlement agreement.

And if I could do that very briefly.

Mr. Cannon says that Ms. Mackey has the ability
to waive confidentiality.
itself says she doesn't.

Well, the settlement agreement
So he's commenting on the

settlement agreement.
THE COURT:

And you're saying that any comment
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1

that he makes, even as far as the confidentiality

2

agreement, anything at all as far as the settlement

3

agreement, is in violation of the agreement,

4
5

MR. HOOLE:

I'm saying anything he says, other

than what is specifically scripted out and put between

6

] quote marks in the confidentiality provision was

7

| prohibited, including the several statements he's made,

8

I because they directly contravene the settlement agreement

g

and they are exposures of the terms of the agreement and

10

violate the non-confidentiality provision.
For example, he says Ms. Mackey has the ability

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

to waive confidentiality.
she does not.

Under the settlement agreement,

So he's stating his opinion, his legal

conclusion of whether or not she can talk.

And she cannot

talk.
THE COURT:

But how does that have anything to do

with the confidentiality agreement?
MR. HOOLE:
settlement agreement.

Because it was a term of the
A term of the settlement agreement

was that nobody would talk about it other than as
specifically set forth.
commenting on it.

And he says she can.

He's

He is mischaracterizing the settlement

agreement and forcing it into a dialogue.
He says also that they are not holding her to
confidentiality.

The settlement agreement holds her to
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confidentiality.
He says that she is free to discuss it and there
would be no benefit for her to talk about it, suggesting
that it will only hurt her if she talks. Well, Your Honor,
we had factual disputes and legal controversies which were
settled.

And for him to come back now and say that, you

know, she can talk about those, but she won't because it
will only hurt her, is clearly in violation of the
settlement agreement.

And it hurts her immensely to have

that published in the newspapers.

It hurts her immensely.

Mr. Cannon says there was no impropriety on his
part.

That was a subject of the settlement.

There was

impropriety on his part, according to Ms. Mackey, and that
was one of the things that was resolved.

That was one of

the legal disputes and factual allegations that was
resolved.
He says that there was no hostile environment in
his office.
settled.

Well, that was one of the disputes that was

He says that there was nothing to her

allegations.

Well, we agreed that we would render the

allegations moot, that neither side would admit them or
concede them.
That allegation, that legal dispute was put to
rest by the settlement agreement, and now he's saying that
there was nothing to it. That is all fairly encompassed
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within the confidentiality provision and our lawsuit.
He says that her allegations have no merit.
Again, he's commenting on the disputes that were laid to
rest.

He says that her allegations would not have held up.

He's commenting on the facts and controversies that were
put in —

that were made moot by the settlement agreement.

He wants the settlement agreement, he's a party to the
settlement agreement.
Counsel will not tell you that he's not a party
to it.

She has filed a motion saying that one of our

original claims, which was tortious interference with
contract, was not well-stated because he was a party to the
agreement.

It so happens that Steve Taggert signed on his

behalf, and that was agreed to.

But he's a party to the

agreement even though he may not have signed it. And
Counsel's dealing with a legal technicality that is a red
herring.

He's a party to the agreement.

He wants the

benefit of this, but he also wants to be able to talk, and
he can't talk about it.
can't talk about this.

That's what we're saying.

He

He agreed not to.

And they're dancing on these legal
technicalities, this head-of-the-pin routine, Your Honor.
It's just that.

It's just that.

We agreed what would be

said and under what circumstances, and we agreed that
nothing else would be said.

The only thing that could be
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said at the stage that Mr. Cannon talked to the Tribune
was, quote, "No comment,11 close quote.
were.

That's where we

This is not an attempt by her to make a lot of money

because she's mad about the settlement agreement.

She's

not mad about the result of the settlement agreement.
entered into it voluntarily.

But an integral part of it

was the confidentiality provision.
THE COURT:

She

He has breached that.

You're saying that he breached the

terms of the confidentiality by giving the terms of the
settlement agreement; is that right?
MR. HOOLE:

I didn't understand the question.

THE COURT:

You're saying that he breached the

confidentiality agreement by giving the terms of the
settlement agreement?
MR. HOOLE:

In part, yes.

she's not bound by confidentiality.
settlement agreement says she is.

Yes.

He has said that

She is.

The

He's saying the

settlement agreement does not bind her.

It does.

He's

commenting on the settlement agreement and the disputes
that were laid to rest.
Your Honor, I wrote him the letter —
Counsel the letter —

not Mr. Cannon.

I wrote

I wrote his counsel

a letter before a town meeting because we had heard that he
was going to talk again about Crelley Mackey.

And I just

reminded them in the letter that he can't do that.
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1
2

Fortunately, nobody asked him any questions.
THE COURT:

Doesn't that get awful narrow as to

3

whether he can have an opinion as to whether she's bound by

4

confidentiality or not?

5

MR. HOOLE:

He can have all the opinions in the

6

world, Your Honor, and so can she, and so can the other

7

parties to this agreement.

8

But they can't express them any more.

9

wouldn't do that.

10

They all have their opinions.
We've agreed that we

Now, Counsel makes a big deal out of the fact

11

that we have not attached a copy of the settlement

12

agreement to this.

13

other parties involved.

And we cannot attach it other than

14

by order of this Court.

And, Your Honor, we have done only

15

what is minimally required to try and stop this and get

16

Mr. Cannon's attention and pursue claims for his vicious

17

violation of this agreement.

18

And our reason for that is there are

Your Honor, this is serious to my client.

19

is not a joking matter, as it might be to others.

20

very serious.

21
22
23
24
25

THE COURT:

This

This is

Well, when you say very serious, how

is she damaged by this?
MR. HOOLE:

Well, she's in counseling —

she's

been in counseling for it.
And I would appreciate it if Counsel would not
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snicker at everything I say.
MS. WOOD:

I apologize, Your Honor.

snickering, but I —

I don't mean to be rude.

MR. HOOLE:
devastating.

She's in counseling.

It's in the press.

I was not

It's been

She has family members

who don't want to talk to her.
THE COURT:

But was that as a result of the

original dispute or was that a result of this so-called
breach of the confidentiality agreement?
MR. HOOLE:

She was in counseling before.

She

had problems because of all the newspaper articles.

It was

a difficult thing for her before, Your Honor.
THE COURT:

Are you saying that this has

escalated it?
MR. HOOLE:

She has damages.

damages in our complaint.

We've alleged

We're entitled to have those

allegations deemed true and accepted by the Court. Yes,
I'm saying that.
THE COURT:

Are you limited by the terms of this

settlement agreement?

I believe there was a limitation of

$10,000 or something, wasn't there?
MR. HOOLE:

No, Your Honor.

We don't believe

that that liquidated damages clause is binding.
something that we've —

It's not

we've briefed to the Court.

I

imagine that that will come up as Counsel files another
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1

motion.
THE COURT:

2
3

today.

Well, that's probably not relevant

I probably shouldn't even have brought it up, so...
MR. HOOLE:

4

I don't believe it is relevant today,

5

Your Honor.

6

matter of what legal damages she's entitled to.

7

to stop this.

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

And it's not just a

We've bargained in good faith.

8
9

Our client is damaged.

nothing wrong.

She needs

We've done

This matter was put to rest for months

before Mr. Cannon went in.

And I'd like to call the

Court's attention to one other provision in the settlement
agreement.
do that.

It says —

well, the Court's read it.

I won't

It says what it says.
To the extent that there is a dispute over what

it means, the Court is entitled to consider whether or not
my client has properly pleaded the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing which entitles her to the benefit of
her bargain.

It's a reasonableness test.

objective test.

It's an

It's a jury question as to whether or not

there's been a violation of that implied covenant.

She's

not asking any more than the contract provides her, but
they have such a tortured definition of what the contract
provides, and talking about legislative privileges when

24

he's talking to a news organization, not in the well of the

25

Senate or in Congress, but walks in to the Tribune?

That
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doesn't apply.

These are red-herring arguments, Your

Honor.
She's entitled to —

she's entitled to stop this

and pursue her case. And there may come a time when the
Court will require us by court order to provide the Courthopefully, in camera —

a copy of the settlement agreement,

I have no objection to that if that's the Court's order.
But I can represent to the Court that the matters which
have been discussed by Mr. Cannon were the matters put to
rest by the settlement agreement, and he did so in
violation of the agreement.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Thank you, Counsel.

Well, of course, I've read your material.
read it before and I've heard your arguments.
to look at it again.

I've

And I want

I want to think about it.

I realize

that the motion to dismiss is a harsh decision sometimes
but, again, if it's well taken, I have the obligation to
grant it and I want to re-read it again myself.

And I'll

call you in the next couple of days.
MS. WOOD:
MR. HOOLE:

Thank you, Your Honor.
Thank you, Your Honor.

(Whereupon, the hearing was concluded.)
-000O000-
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(Teilephone conference in chambers.)
THE CLERK:

Okay.

I think we've got everybody.

Are we there, counsel?
MS. WOOD:

Mary Anne Wood is here.

MR. O'BRIEN:

Michael O'Brien here.

MR. HOOLE:

Roger Hoole is here.

THE COURT:

This is Judge Wilkinson.

Let me let

you know that we are on the record, the conversation is
being taken down and you're placed on speaker.
I'm calling to give you my decision in this case
of Crelley Mackey versus Chris Cannon.

First of all,

Mr. Hoole has filed a motion to open up the record and
supplement the record with the

—

(Telephone disconnected.)
MR. HOOLE:
MS. WOOD:

Roger Hoole.
This is Mary Anne.

MR. O'BRIEN:
THE COURT:

Same here.
Okay.

I can hear you.

Mike O'Brien.

As I indicated to you, we are

on the record and I'm calling to give you my decision in
the case of Crelley Mackey versus Chris Cannon.
The first issue is that Mr. Hoole has filed a
motion to supplement the record and allow me to go into the
settlement agreement.

This has been opposed by
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1

Mr. O'Brien.

2

think I need to have the record to make a decision and I

3

don't really desire to get into the settlement agreement

4

J anyway.

But even without that opposition, I don't

Therefore, I'm going to deny the motion to open up

the record or supplement it with the settlement agreement.
6
7

I

Now, I've gone over the memorandums again and
looked at this.

And I'm looking right now at the

memorandum filed by Mr. Hoole in opposition to defendant's
g

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

motion to dismiss.

And on page 4, he lists eight areas in

which he thinks that the settlement agreement has been
breached.

I've gone over and I've marked the first five of

those that —

where I find that there has been some

reference in the Tribune article to what he says here.
And, of course, the first two have to do with
confidentiality.

And, yes, he did say that Crelley Mackey

has the ability to waive confidentiality and that they are
not holding her to it.
However, I do not think that this amounts to a
breach of the settlement agreement.

I think he merely

stated a fact that the settlement agreement is
confidential, but as far as he's concerned, Mrs. Mackey can
breach that or say what she wants to.

I don't think that

that amounts to a breach of it.
And No. C is also very similar to that, that
she's free to discuss it as she sees fit.

And, again, I
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think this goes to the fact that both parties are bound by
it but that Mr. Cannon, as far as he's concerned, she may
discuss it as she sees fit.
The next two, D and E, get a little more close to
it, where he says there's no impropriety on Mr. Cannon's
part and there's no hostile environment.

He does make

statements to that effect as far as the Tribune article is
concerned.

But, again, I would find that these are not

breaches of the agreement.

I think that the exceptions to

the confidentiality are broad enough to cover a mere
statement that there's no impropriety or that the hostile
environment did not exist.
disparaging.

I don't think it is

I don't think it breaks the intent of the

confidentiality agreement in any way.
The last three is that there was nothing to
Mrs. Mackey's allegations, that Mrs. Mackey's allegation
had no merit and the allegations wouldn't have held up.
I don't find in the Tribune article or the
Deseret News article that Mr. Cannon really gets into that
subject.
Therefore, what I'm saying, as far as these eight
are concerned —

and, of course, Mr. Hoole also says that

these do not include everything —

but I do not find, as

far as these eight are concerned, that there's been a
breach of the confidentiality agreement.
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Now, the agreement —

also, the exception, of

course, says that they are to contact Mr. Hoole before
discussing this.

I think the record showed that he was

contacted before the Deseret News article came out.

And

I'm not sure that the contact there would not be broad
enough to apply to —
reporter.
them —

to a discussion with the Tribune

In fact, I'm finding that he did not talk to

to Mr. Hoole before talking to the Tribune, but I

think that there was no damage done.

I think that he had

been contacted earlier and it was probably broad enough.
What I am saying is that I'm finding in favor of
the defendants and against the plaintiff.

I find that

there has not been any breach of the contract of
confidentiality, the settlement agreement, and also the
other issue that there has not been a breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Of course, I want

to make it straight, there were some statements made there
that Utah does not recognize this.

And I never said that

and I always maintain that that was a cause of action.

But

I do not feel it's been breached in this case.
Any questions?

nobody

MR. HOOLE:

Your Honor

—

THE COURT:

Please state your name.

MR. HOOLE:

—

so the Court's ruling that

—
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1

THE COURT:

Please state your name.

2

MR. HOOLE:

Excuse me.

3

THE COURT:

Okay.

4

MR. HOOLE:

Is it the Court's ruling that nobody

5

that was a party to the settlement agreement is bound by a

6

confidentiality clause?
THE COURT:

7

No, that is not the agreement.

I

8

think all parties are bound by the confidentiality clause.

9

But I think either party, Crelley Mackey or Mr. Cannon,

10

could say, "As far as I'm concerned, they can talk about

11

it.

12

doesn't matter to me."

13
14

1

This is Roger Hoole.

I don't care if they breach the confidentiality.

It

But, yes, I find that they are bound by it and it
is in there.

15

Any other questions?

16

MR. HOOLE:

Your Honor, you mentioned before we

17

were cut off the first time —

again, this is Roger H o o l e —

18

that this ruling's on the record?

19

THE COURT:

Yes.

20

MR. HOOLE:

Okay.

21

THE COURT:

Any other questions?

a.

0

22

If not, then

I'd ask Ms. Wood if you would please prepare an order.

23

MS. WOOD:

24

THE COURT:

25

MS. WOOD:

I will, Your Honor.
Thank you, counsel.
Thank you.
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1

MR. HOOLE:

2

MR. O'BRIEN:

3

MS. WOOD:

4

MR. HOOLE:

Bye-bye.

5

THE COURT:

Goodbye.

6

(Whereupon, the conference was concluded.)

7

Thank you, Your Honor.
Thank you, Your Honor.

Bye-bye.

-oooOooo-

8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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WOOD CRAPO LLC
Mary Anne Q. Wood #3539
Sheri A. Mower #6359
500 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 366-6060
Attorneys for Defendants

F

' " ° ^STRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

JAN 1 I 1999
tnAKE COUNTY

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CRELLEY MACKEY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CHRIS CANNON, Individually,
THE OFFICE OF CONGRESSMAN
CHRIS CANNON, CHRIS CANNON FOR
CONGRESS, INC., CANNON
INDUSTRIES, INC., THE CI GROUP, and
CANNON ENGINEERING
TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED
COMPLAINT AND PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT THE
RECORD

Civil No. -980903903Judge Homer J. Wilkinson

Defendants.

This matter came for hearing on December 10, 1998 on Defendants' motion to
dismiss Plaintiffs Amended Complaint. Plaintiff was represented by Roger H. Hoole and
Heather E. Morrison. Defendants were represented by Mary Anne Q. Wood and
Sheri A. Mower. The Court, having reviewed the memoranda of the parties and after hearing
argument of counsel, took the matter under advisement. Subsequent to the hearing, Plaintiff
filed a motion to supplement the record. On December 15, 1998, the Court convened a
conference call with all counsel of record present. Roger Hoole was present on behalf of

Plaintiff. Defendants were represented by Mary Anne Q. Wood and The Kearns Tribune
Corporation was represented by Michael Patrick O'Brien. The Court announced its ruling on
the record.
The Court denied Plaintiffs motion to supplement the record for the reason that
the Court did not need to read the entire settlement agreement in order to consider the motion
to dismiss. Paragraph 14 of Plaintiff s Amended Complaint includes Plaintiffs allegations of
the statements by Mr. Cannon that Plaintiff claims constituted breaches of the settlement
agreement. The Court, having considered each allegation, A through H, in turn and having
compared these allegations to the language of the settlement agreement as set forth in
Paragraph 10 of the Amended Complaint, finds that none of the alleged statements constitute a
breach of the settlement agreement.
The Court further found that Mr. Cannon did not breach the settlement
agreement by failing to notify Roger Hoole prior to speaking to the Salt Lake Tribune since he
had previously notified Mr. Hoole prior to speaking with the Deseret News. This fact was
undisputed by Mr. Hoole in the hearing.
It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed that the above referenced matter is
dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this ]]_ day of
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on me^Jfrlay of December, 1998, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Order on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint
and Plaintiffs Motion to Supplement the Record was mailed in the U.S. Mail, postage
prepaid, to:
Roger H. Hoole, Esq.
Heather E. Morrison, Esq.
HOOLE & KING, L.C.
4276 South Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124
Michael Patrick O'Brien, Esq.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH
1500 Wells Fargo Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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